Hey mate has anything in particular prompted your sentiment?Unfortunately Ken see straight you might need to go to Specsavers. As much as I would love 10billion I unfortunately have to adjust my expectations. Cunts going to fuck us unfortunately.
AVZ Discussion 2022
- Thread starter GazDix
- Start date
cruiser51
Top 20
https://x.com/KiengeKki
KIKI KIENGE
https://x.com/KiengeKki
@KiengeKki
Translated from French by
A look at the Declaration of Principle Doha: capitulation or diplomatic strategy?
By Kiki #Kienge
"Never, ever, will I negotiate with Rwanda's puppets! Dialogue with a terrorist group like the M23 is a red line we will never cross." Félix Tshisekedi.
On July 19, 2025, the Democratic Republic of Congo signed a Declaration of Principles with the M23/AFC in Doha, a preliminary agreement intended to pave the way for a permanent ceasefire and a comprehensive peace process.
But upon closer inspection, this text marks less a turning point toward peace than an abandonment of the red line once defended by Kinshasa.
The text signed in Doha grants the AFC/M23 major political, diplomatic and strategic advantages:
1. Political legitimacy.
The AFC/M23 officially becomes a negotiating party recognized by the Congolese state, breaking the official narrative that it was a "terrorist, criminal, or pro-Rwandan" group. This status gives the movement an international footing, placing it on an equal footing with Kinshasa, through a rhetoric of "mutual commitments" and "frank dialogue."
2. Implicit territorial freeze.
The text does not contain any clear and immediate demand for the withdrawal of the AFC/M23 from the occupied territories (Goma, Rutshuru, Masisi, etc.). The AFC/M23 retains de facto control over large swathes of eastern Congo, pending negotiations on a possible timetable. The restoration of state authority is conditional on "resolving the causes of the conflict": a vague formulation, without a specific deadline.
3. Release of their prisoners.
Confidence-building measures include the release of detainees of interest, a historical demand of the AFC/M23, often used to secure the release of its military and political cadres.
4. Schedule imposed at the expense of Kinshasa.
The deadlines are fast: direct negotiations before August 8, final agreement planned for August 17, 2025. This puts Kinshasa under pressure without offering concrete guarantees in the short term (neither disarmament, nor immediate withdrawal, nor verified security conditions).
The DRC's strategic errors and setbacks.
1. Major political contradiction.
By agreeing to sign with the AFC/M23, Kinshasa is denying its own narrative: that of a categorical refusal to negotiate with an organization accused of being used by Rwanda. This about-face undermines the credibility of the national and diplomatic discourse held since 2022.
2. Absence of binding clauses.
The text is full of general principles and empty formulations: "will for dialogue", "lasting peace", "climate of trust"... but no binding element on: - the disarmament of the AFC/M23; - the immediate withdrawal from the occupied areas; - the restoration of Congolese institutions. In short, the DRC is not gaining anything concrete in the short term. The AFC/M23, for its part, is freezing its military gains under diplomatic cover.
3. Dangerous diplomatic staging.
The Congolese state agrees to negotiate within a multilateral framework (Qatar, USA, AU), but without controlling the tempo or the balance of power, which leans largely in favor of the AFC/M23 and its regional supporters.
4. Reduction of sovereignty in practice.
The principle of "state restoration" becomes a future possibility, dependent on a tripartite peace agreement including... Rwanda. Thus, the DRC loses control over the very definition of its sovereignty over the eastern part of the country.
What the text does not say:
the red lines evacuated
This text carefully avoids several essential subjects:
- Justice for war crimes: no mention of prosecutions or transitional justice mechanisms.
- The root causes of the conflict are not defined: is it ethnicity? Mineral resources? Rwanda's role?
- The participation of Congolese civil society: totally absent from the process.
In short, it is a diplomacy without people and without a clear vision, conducted between belligerents in a logic of unbalanced compromise.
And now, what next after Doha?
The text provides for a cascade of upcoming negotiations, supposed to lead to a comprehensive peace agreement by August 2025, but three major obstacles remain:
1. The real implementation of the ceasefire, which has failed several times in the past.
2. Kinshasa's ability to regain administrative and security control of the east of the country.
3. Popular protest: many voices are already being raised against what they perceive as a "betrayal" of the dead in Kivu and a pact sealed in contempt of the victims.
Conclusion:
A text to save face, not to save the country.
This declaration is less a tool for peace than a strategic retreat by the DRC, dictated by military failure, international pressure, and the humanitarian impasse.
The M23/AFC emerges from it strengthened, rehabilitated, and consolidated on the ground.
Kinshasa, for its part, signed because it no longer had the means to say no, either militarily to the AFC/M23, or diplomatically to Donald Trump.
Peace in Doha is not yet peace in the Congo. It is, at best, a veiled pause; at worst, a legalization of a power struggle imposed by war.
KIKI KIENGE
https://x.com/KiengeKki
@KiengeKki
Translated from French by
A look at the Declaration of Principle Doha: capitulation or diplomatic strategy?
By Kiki #Kienge
"Never, ever, will I negotiate with Rwanda's puppets! Dialogue with a terrorist group like the M23 is a red line we will never cross." Félix Tshisekedi.
On July 19, 2025, the Democratic Republic of Congo signed a Declaration of Principles with the M23/AFC in Doha, a preliminary agreement intended to pave the way for a permanent ceasefire and a comprehensive peace process.
But upon closer inspection, this text marks less a turning point toward peace than an abandonment of the red line once defended by Kinshasa.
The text signed in Doha grants the AFC/M23 major political, diplomatic and strategic advantages:
1. Political legitimacy.
The AFC/M23 officially becomes a negotiating party recognized by the Congolese state, breaking the official narrative that it was a "terrorist, criminal, or pro-Rwandan" group. This status gives the movement an international footing, placing it on an equal footing with Kinshasa, through a rhetoric of "mutual commitments" and "frank dialogue."
2. Implicit territorial freeze.
The text does not contain any clear and immediate demand for the withdrawal of the AFC/M23 from the occupied territories (Goma, Rutshuru, Masisi, etc.). The AFC/M23 retains de facto control over large swathes of eastern Congo, pending negotiations on a possible timetable. The restoration of state authority is conditional on "resolving the causes of the conflict": a vague formulation, without a specific deadline.
3. Release of their prisoners.
Confidence-building measures include the release of detainees of interest, a historical demand of the AFC/M23, often used to secure the release of its military and political cadres.
4. Schedule imposed at the expense of Kinshasa.
The deadlines are fast: direct negotiations before August 8, final agreement planned for August 17, 2025. This puts Kinshasa under pressure without offering concrete guarantees in the short term (neither disarmament, nor immediate withdrawal, nor verified security conditions).
The DRC's strategic errors and setbacks.
1. Major political contradiction.
By agreeing to sign with the AFC/M23, Kinshasa is denying its own narrative: that of a categorical refusal to negotiate with an organization accused of being used by Rwanda. This about-face undermines the credibility of the national and diplomatic discourse held since 2022.
2. Absence of binding clauses.
The text is full of general principles and empty formulations: "will for dialogue", "lasting peace", "climate of trust"... but no binding element on: - the disarmament of the AFC/M23; - the immediate withdrawal from the occupied areas; - the restoration of Congolese institutions. In short, the DRC is not gaining anything concrete in the short term. The AFC/M23, for its part, is freezing its military gains under diplomatic cover.
3. Dangerous diplomatic staging.
The Congolese state agrees to negotiate within a multilateral framework (Qatar, USA, AU), but without controlling the tempo or the balance of power, which leans largely in favor of the AFC/M23 and its regional supporters.
4. Reduction of sovereignty in practice.
The principle of "state restoration" becomes a future possibility, dependent on a tripartite peace agreement including... Rwanda. Thus, the DRC loses control over the very definition of its sovereignty over the eastern part of the country.
What the text does not say:
the red lines evacuated
This text carefully avoids several essential subjects:
- Justice for war crimes: no mention of prosecutions or transitional justice mechanisms.
- The root causes of the conflict are not defined: is it ethnicity? Mineral resources? Rwanda's role?
- The participation of Congolese civil society: totally absent from the process.
In short, it is a diplomacy without people and without a clear vision, conducted between belligerents in a logic of unbalanced compromise.
And now, what next after Doha?
The text provides for a cascade of upcoming negotiations, supposed to lead to a comprehensive peace agreement by August 2025, but three major obstacles remain:
1. The real implementation of the ceasefire, which has failed several times in the past.
2. Kinshasa's ability to regain administrative and security control of the east of the country.
3. Popular protest: many voices are already being raised against what they perceive as a "betrayal" of the dead in Kivu and a pact sealed in contempt of the victims.
Conclusion:
A text to save face, not to save the country.
This declaration is less a tool for peace than a strategic retreat by the DRC, dictated by military failure, international pressure, and the humanitarian impasse.
The M23/AFC emerges from it strengthened, rehabilitated, and consolidated on the ground.
Kinshasa, for its part, signed because it no longer had the means to say no, either militarily to the AFC/M23, or diplomatically to Donald Trump.
Peace in Doha is not yet peace in the Congo. It is, at best, a veiled pause; at worst, a legalization of a power struggle imposed by war.
Samus
Top 20
Here's my thoughts.Thoughts for feedback...
1. Presumably Kobold offer AVZ a payout to close our claims and hand over our data/BFS saving face for the DRC confirming their argument that Dathcom lost rights to PR13359. Therefore, the DRC should have no say regarding the payout figure nor should it be based on a percentage of ownership of Dathcom, it's simply a $ figure based on what we're willing to accept to piss off.
2. Independently Kobold will do a seperate deal for JV over PR13359 with DRC/Cominere, maybe $70m donation, and circumvent the exploration process by using our data. Mining license expedited only due to AVZ's background work on the tenement.
3. Dathomir and Zinjin claims against AVZ become irrelevant as Dathcom owns nothing?.... maybe they could open ICC cases against Kobold/DRC
4. Given the first two points.... why should we settle for anything less than US$10b, if not for AVZ's exceptional work the value of Manono may have never been realised or have been entirely stolen by Chinese. Kobold & DRC are therefore both up shit creek if we don't give up our claims or sell on data. A ICSID claim against Kobold, if they do a deal without paying us out, could be significantly more fruitful in the long term.
I reckon you're one of the trolls aliases that wasn't flushed out.
And first you rocked up here acting like you'd been here for years pretending to be everybody's long lost mate just like the rest of them.
I reckon @zeeb0t missed you in the purge.
Edit: and that's all I've got to say about it, I trust admin will look into your legitimacy.
As far as myself on ignore you go as a fuckwit.
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Here's my thoughts.
I reckon you're one of the trolls aliases that wasn't flushed out.
I'm honestly hope you're not interested in taking this forum back to to that dark place where some folks treated every emerged user, including me, like a troll. Yeah maybe I was a bit harsh with that comment but come'on you guys were carrying on causing half of the shit happing because of your own actions, it was obvious. Don't really give a fuck if what you think of me, all I know if I want my fucking money back too so just trying to offer some constructive thoughts.
Dave Evans
Regular
Great information in that post Sam. CAMI has supposedly updated their maps and it shows AVZ still has the two current exploration permits surrounding PR13359. They probably haven’t tried to take those tenements from AVZ because the permits haven’t included lithium or tin. Imagine how the DRC would try and rip those off us if KoBold found a few million tonnes of lithium in those tenements.
Aside from that, I wonder if anyone else here is seeing how the DRC are extorting money out of KoBold. Effectively they are getting KoBold to pay off Cominiere’s current debt and the debt they would end up owing to us if the ICC and ICSID cases were allowed to continue to finalisation.
The US is desperate for the minerals (including Manono) in the near term, but rather than using all their power, they are allowing the DRC to use the corrupt scum in Cominiere and CAMI, and equally corrupt Ministers to take part in KoBold getting a permit.
Don’t know why Trump doesn’t say, give us the minerals and fuck the scum off or we’ll turn a blind eye to Rwanda and do a deal with them once they take over your mines.
Once again, here’s a reminder of the corruption and what KoBold claims on their website
2021
Recording of Celestin Kibeya’s secret deal with Zijin
https://x.com/kongopress/status/1644597533987987456
2022Zijin claims Cominiere sold 15% of Dathcom’s shares to Jin Cheng Mining and sent a letter to Cominiere threatening Cominiere if they reneged on the deal
View attachment 68092
View attachment 68096
These are the important pages
2022
The Inspector General of Finance provided evidence showing Cominiere’s sale of shares to Zijin subsidiary Jin Cheng was illegal and fraudulent
https://static1.squarespace.com/sta...f+DRC+Mining+Assets+by+COMINIERE+SA+-+ENG.pdf
2023
The International Chamber of Commerce ordered Cominiere not to take any action towards terminating the Dathcom JV with AVZ and should Cominiere violate the ICC orders it would be subject to a penalty of €50,000 per day
https://static1.squarespace.com/sta...rable+Ruling+in+ICC+Emergency+Arbitration.pdf
2023
The ICC ordered Cominiere not to take any steps to explore or exploit (directly or indirectly) within PR13359 and PR15775.
The ICC concluded that Cominiere violated both ICC orders and deliberately concealed evidence. The ICC then ordered Cominiere to now pay penalties of €100,000 per day for violating the ICC orders
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5934d2ae6b8f5beeb5ba23f3/t/6556c81619b89256c649135d/1700186135012/20231117+-+ASX+AVZ+Successfully+Restrains+Cominière+and+Additional+ICC+Arbitration+Updates.pdf
2024
ICSID orders the DRC to re-establish Dathcom as the holder of PR13359 and Cominiere to refrain from taking any act likely to call into question PR13359
https://static1.squarespace.com/sta...+AVZ+Successful+in+ICSID+Interim+Measures.pdf
2025
The DRC and Cominiere continue to violate ICSID and ICC orders.
The International Chamber of Commerce provides evidence showing Cominiere acted illegally and orders Cominiere to pay AVZ €39,000,000 in penalty’s
https://static1.squarespace.com/sta...de+Courtoisie+de+la+Sentence+Partielle_en.pdf
Additional reports on Cominiere’s BOD accepting money from Zijin, including Lisette Tshibwabwa Kabanga and David Engazi
Lisette Tshibwabwa Kabanga
31/07/2023 Lithium: the COMINIERE and the Congolese State paid US$1.6 million for the lobbying of Lisette Tshibwabwa Kabanga "Lisette Kabanga Tshibwabwa justified in particular the legality of lobbying in Congo" NEWSECONOMY Lithium: the COMINIERE and the Congolese State paid US$1.6 million...
thestockexchange.com.au
David E’ngazi $70 Million Fraud
19/04/2024 Lithium: the intriguing transformation of $ 70 million from Zijin Mining to an NGO As part of its partnership with La Comminière, a subsidiary of the Chinese mining Zijin paid an important contribution to a mysterious Congolese NGO, whose president is himself a public company...
thestockexchange.com.au
I’m so sick of seeing their wanker faces popping up talking bullshit that I started working on that book someone suggested in case KoBold don’t pay us what we’re worth. It opens with this….
21,000 AVZ investors and millions of international investors around the world bear witness to the Democratic Republic of Congo’s attempts to get away with the biggest mining fraud in history and effectively extort billions of dollars in the process.
The international tribunals of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and International Court for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) along with DRC’s Inspector General of Finance (IGF) all showed evidence of fraud and violations of International and Domestic Mining Laws by the DRC Government and its mining authorities including Cominiere and the DRC Mining Cadastre (CAMI).
Attachments
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cruiser51
Top 20
Samus
Top 20
I'm okay with that as long as they actually do pay the related fair value. If we're talking about paying off enough to cover the ICC/ICSID damages then that $10b USD seems to be about where fair value currently lies. Not this 67c & 80c/share (AUD) bullshit that's been floating around.
The roughly $4.15AUD/share is still a bargain for the pricks. Pocket change for a billionaire consortium.
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KentCStrait
Regular
Hence why I said if it comes to a vote. I do worry too KoBold are going to rip us off. Honestly, I think what they're doing, securing 1,600 square kilometers of exploration licenses, is far worse than anything the Chinese Rat Fuckers have done to the DRC. KoBold has just been way more sophisticated about how they've gone about it.Unfortunately Ken see straight you might need to go to Specsavers. As much as I would love 10billion I unfortunately have to adjust my expectations. Cunts going to fuck us unfortunately.
My 2c worth:
We have an agreement with KoBold that references a framework for how they will acquire Manono from us.
Despite understandable speculation, its plausible that their agreement with DRC is part of the framework agreed with AVZ.
If its not, then it's directly in contrast with the AVZ agreement and a great excuse for AVZ to continue negotiating with other potential buyers (which speculation on here seems to think there are).
I for one will assume the former. We are winning our legal cases, and KoBold gains nothing from acquiring an asset that comes bundled with a whole new set of legal actions. Especially when they have already publicly acknowledged our rights to the tenement.
KoBolds options here are not:
1. Screw AVZ over for a good deal.
2. Screw harder for an even good-er deal
It's:
1. Make an amicable agreement with both AVZ and DRC to acquire the lithium asset of the century,
2. FUCK OFF AND GO HOME WITH NOTHING.
I do not believe they intend to go home with nothing.
We have an agreement with KoBold that references a framework for how they will acquire Manono from us.
Despite understandable speculation, its plausible that their agreement with DRC is part of the framework agreed with AVZ.
If its not, then it's directly in contrast with the AVZ agreement and a great excuse for AVZ to continue negotiating with other potential buyers (which speculation on here seems to think there are).
I for one will assume the former. We are winning our legal cases, and KoBold gains nothing from acquiring an asset that comes bundled with a whole new set of legal actions. Especially when they have already publicly acknowledged our rights to the tenement.
KoBolds options here are not:
1. Screw AVZ over for a good deal.
2. Screw harder for an even good-er deal
It's:
1. Make an amicable agreement with both AVZ and DRC to acquire the lithium asset of the century,
2. FUCK OFF AND GO HOME WITH NOTHING.
I do not believe they intend to go home with nothing.
Xerof
Flaming 1967
But buying AVZ shares right now is just buying into the same position we are all in. This deal with Kobold is probably not to buy AVZ and all it’s subsidiaries, it’s for us to fuck off with some cash, and no claims whatsoever to the tenements in Manono
Mute22
Regular
Skar
Regular
Walk away from 850Mt of Lithium, at surface with low impurities... I am seeing 10B USD thrown around in ICC/ICSD.
The problem I see with any bids from a consortium is Kobold positioning themselves as the chosen one with the snack eaters.
If there is any action required by Felix/DRC as part of this deal, then Kobold has a 2 year head start on the competition.
That is, if we aren't prepared to walk away and go full length ICSID.
If there is any action required by Felix/DRC as part of this deal, then Kobold has a 2 year head start on the competition.
That is, if we aren't prepared to walk away and go full length ICSID.
Xerof
Flaming 1967
Mate, I would dearly love that to be the amount they give us to fuck off with too, don’t get me wrong
Mouthpiecenomnom
Regular
I agree with this take. Call me naive but the kobold CEO has given us no real reason to be suspicious. Imagine you are the Kobold CEO. You go to AVZ with a number to fuck off. Number is accepted by the BOD. Next go to Felix. Say "hey we can circumvent all the bs and make kobold the owner of Manono south +exploration tenements etc." Kobold CEO is making damn sure the DRC won't pull a fast one. He wants reassurances that the money to AVZ isn't going too be wasted. Felix says okay. They do a deal to make it happen in warp speed. This requires CK to pull the levers. Involving CK is a disasteful but pragmatic solution to getting a ML fast.
Understandably AVZ shareholders are triggered and suspicious of his involvement but it's no reason to jump to conclusions. Imo cheersEdit: This idea is from my general take on the kobold CEO. He seems far more concerned about locking a deal in fast/time than he is concerned about $. This works to our favour.
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David Krappenschitz
Regular
Say it's a cash payout, i.e. AVZ receives cash from Kobold for the stake in Manono project. Can that then distributed to SHs in a way that allows CGT discount benefit? Would assume if paid as dividend it would be taxed the same as standard income tax?
Would management doing a share buyback be something that allows shareholders to get the 50% CGT discount?
Would management doing a share buyback be something that allows shareholders to get the 50% CGT discount?
KentCStrait
Regular
This is going to enrage people, and rightly so given the Australian Government has done absolutely nothing for us, but the company is going to have to pay tax on the KoBold payout. And then we're going to have to pay tax again. To trigger CGT discounts, and minimize tax it's should be a share buyback plus a franked dividend. Prepare yourselves, we are going to get fucked again, just the degree of lubrication used is going to depend on how the return of our money is structured.
Also, even if the cash hits AVZ's account tomorrow, it's likely going to 6 months plus before we see a cent. ASIC and the ATO are going to want their say in it.
dollarbills
Regular
I really wish Kobold just buy out AVZ. That would be an easy CGT event.. Hopefully Nigel can persuade them to do so and perhaps some of the AVZ staff will stay on and work for Kobold.
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