https://x.com/KiengeKki
KIKI KIENGE
https://x.com/KiengeKki
@KiengeKki
Translated from French by
A look at the Declaration of Principle Doha: capitulation or diplomatic strategy?
By Kiki
#Kienge
"Never, ever, will I negotiate with Rwanda's puppets! Dialogue with a terrorist group like the M23 is a red line we will never cross." Félix Tshisekedi.
On July 19, 2025, the Democratic Republic of Congo signed a Declaration of Principles with the M23/AFC in Doha, a preliminary agreement intended to pave the way for a permanent ceasefire and a comprehensive peace process.
But upon closer inspection, this text marks less a turning point toward peace than an abandonment of the red line once defended by Kinshasa.
The text signed in Doha grants the AFC/M23 major political, diplomatic and strategic advantages:
1. Political legitimacy.
The AFC/M23 officially becomes a negotiating party recognized by the Congolese state, breaking the official narrative that it was a "terrorist, criminal, or pro-Rwandan" group. This status gives the movement an international footing, placing it on an equal footing with Kinshasa, through a rhetoric of "mutual commitments" and "frank dialogue."
2. Implicit territorial freeze.
The text does not contain any clear and immediate demand for the withdrawal of the AFC/M23 from the occupied territories (Goma, Rutshuru, Masisi, etc.). The AFC/M23 retains de facto control over large swathes of eastern Congo, pending negotiations on a possible timetable. The restoration of state authority is conditional on "resolving the causes of the conflict": a vague formulation, without a specific deadline.
3. Release of their prisoners.
Confidence-building measures include the release of detainees of interest, a historical demand of the AFC/M23, often used to secure the release of its military and political cadres.
4. Schedule imposed at the expense of Kinshasa.
The deadlines are fast: direct negotiations before August 8, final agreement planned for August 17, 2025. This puts Kinshasa under pressure without offering concrete guarantees in the short term (neither disarmament, nor immediate withdrawal, nor verified security conditions).
The DRC's strategic errors and setbacks.
1. Major political contradiction.
By agreeing to sign with the AFC/M23, Kinshasa is denying its own narrative: that of a categorical refusal to negotiate with an organization accused of being used by Rwanda. This about-face undermines the credibility of the national and diplomatic discourse held since 2022.
2. Absence of binding clauses.
The text is full of general principles and empty formulations: "will for dialogue", "lasting peace", "climate of trust"... but no binding element on: - the disarmament of the AFC/M23; - the immediate withdrawal from the occupied areas; - the restoration of Congolese institutions. In short, the DRC is not gaining anything concrete in the short term. The AFC/M23, for its part, is freezing its military gains under diplomatic cover.
3. Dangerous diplomatic staging.
The Congolese state agrees to negotiate within a multilateral framework (Qatar, USA, AU), but without controlling the tempo or the balance of power, which leans largely in favor of the AFC/M23 and its regional supporters.
4. Reduction of sovereignty in practice.
The principle of "state restoration" becomes a future possibility, dependent on a tripartite peace agreement including... Rwanda. Thus, the DRC loses control over the very definition of its sovereignty over the eastern part of the country.
What the text does not say:
the red lines evacuated
This text carefully avoids several essential subjects:
- Justice for war crimes: no mention of prosecutions or transitional justice mechanisms.
- The root causes of the conflict are not defined: is it ethnicity? Mineral resources? Rwanda's role?
- The participation of Congolese civil society: totally absent from the process.
In short, it is a diplomacy without people and without a clear vision, conducted between belligerents in a logic of unbalanced compromise.
And now, what next after Doha?
The text provides for a cascade of upcoming negotiations, supposed to lead to a comprehensive peace agreement by August 2025, but three major obstacles remain:
1. The real implementation of the ceasefire, which has failed several times in the past.
2. Kinshasa's ability to regain administrative and security control of the east of the country.
3. Popular protest: many voices are already being raised against what they perceive as a "betrayal" of the dead in Kivu and a pact sealed in contempt of the victims.
Conclusion:
A text to save face, not to save the country.
This declaration is less a tool for peace than a strategic retreat by the DRC, dictated by military failure, international pressure, and the humanitarian impasse.
The M23/AFC emerges from it strengthened, rehabilitated, and consolidated on the ground.
Kinshasa, for its part, signed because it no longer had the means to say no, either militarily to the AFC/M23, or diplomatically to Donald Trump.
Peace in Doha is not yet peace in the Congo. It is, at best, a veiled pause; at worst, a legalization of a power struggle imposed by war.