John25
Regular
I can tell you wont last long on this forum, you racist piece of shit....
Piss off now, or I and others will do it for you..
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AVZ Discussion 2022
- Thread starter GazDix
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JAG
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DiscoDanNZ
Regular
Well I have never read anything factual written by geo, so not holding my breath
I would think AVZ need to address the latest developments around 13359/15575 and also the apparent trespassing onto the hydro station. Might also get something out of ICC and/or ICSID
These are jmt’s, so don’t hold me to it
As for the cockteasing threat of releasing salacious scandal re Tommy, klaus, Z, Celestine, boatman, and Liarlars, it will do nothing to promote getting the ML imo, so will be another fucking sideshow. It’s fairly obvious who it is and I hope he doesn’t tie it back to TSE members or AVZ
But I can’t wait to hear it. Fuck we need some comedy
Personally I'm looking forward to the Tommy sideshow, hoping it's more of a freak show though. It couldn't happen to a slimier piece of shit unless it happened to one of his overlords like Boatman or Klaus.
Carlos Danger
Top 20
Cumquat Cap
Regular
How about those pricks pull a weekend shift and get it to market ASAP
Winenut
Go AVZ!
God knows I fucking did for the companies I represented and probably with less fucking shit on the line....
Get the fucking shit sorted and inform the shareholders ....we're paying the wages currently and as far as I can see there ain't no other fucking income
Živjo kreten, zakaj ne odjebeš nazaj pod svojo skalo?
Prekleti drkalec!
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No one paid attention to last week’s Belt and Road forum—and that’s bad for Xi
26 Oct 2023|Jacinta Keast
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With all that’s going on in the world, you could be forgiven for missing that the 10th anniversary forum of Xi Jinping’s flagship foreign policy and trade program, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), was held in Beijing in the middle of last week. Some saw the West’s involvement in conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine as creating a strategic opening for Chinese diplomacy at the forum. But that’s a misreading of China’s public diplomacy goals and a far too rosy view of how last week’s event actually went.
China wants the world to value the BRI and to view China as a legitimate leader of nations in global development. As an initiative that Xi himself proposed in 2013, its success is directly linked to his power as a leader.
Beijing saw this forum as a crucial chance to advocate for its ‘global community of shared future’ proposal. In the run-up, it released a white paper outlining how this proposal could lead to a new type of international relations that rejects the Western-led multilateral order and its emphasis on ‘universal values’. It also published a white paper on the BRI, positioning it as a core pillar of the ‘global community of shared future’ proposal. Xi’s keynote address at the conference focused on lauding the achievements of the first 10 years of the BRI and how following China’s development path through the ‘global community of shared future’ was the best way towards world peace and prosperity.
This message fell on deaf ears. Chinese state media reported that representatives from more than 140 countries attended the event, but, in fact, only 21 countries sent representatives at the head-of-state level. That’s the lowest ever attendance of heads of state at a BRI forum. Notably, the leaders of Brazil, India and South Africa—which, along with Russia and China, comprise BRICS—were absent.
In a telling contrast, Fiji’s Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka chose to make a state visit to Australia last week rather than attend the forum, sending his deputy to China instead. No bilateral BRI projects between China and Fiji were announced at the forum, whereas Australia announced a new pathway to permanent residency for citizens of the Pacific island countries and Timor-Leste. This is something China would never be able to offer the Pacific and addresses a genuine policy want from countries in the region.
China also made a public diplomacy blunder in giving Russian President Vladmir Putin top billing at the forum. Putin appeared next to Xi in the leader’s photo and was given the most important position after Xi as a keynote speaker. While we should worry about the strengthening Sino-Russian ‘no limits’ partnership, Russia isn’t even formally part of the BRI. Rather than emphasising strength and unity, giving Putin such a prominent role instead undercut China’s claims to multilateralism and anti-hegemony. That’s not to mention the image problems China has from its support of another rogue actor, the Taliban, who were invited to attend the forum and have been encouraged to join the BRI.
Many countries may have sent representatives to the forum as a way to maintain good relations with China, but not to further deepen their engagement with the BRI. With many Chinese development banks and financing institutions in attendance, countries with large BRI projects may have also used it as an opportunity to negotiate their existing financial agreements with China, rather than sign on to new deals. Indeed, Sri Lanka, which owes Chinese lenders more than US$7 billion, had its president advocating that a lack of debt relief for low-income countries posed an existential risk to the BRI.
In analysing where the BRI is going, we should look at what China does, not what it says. Major BRI projects are typically announced in an outcomes document from the forum, and an analysis of this year’s outcomes show a gap between what China says its new vision for the BRI is and what it is actually funding. Most projects in the list are not new deals and had already been announced prior to the forum. For example, the document announced that China would build the Solomon Islands’ national broadband network, although the deal was already signed more than a year ago. Similarly, China said it would construct the Kaduna–Kano railway in Nigeria, but ground was already broken on the project in mid-2021.
At the forum, Xi announced that ‘green development’ in the BRI would be a major step in the initiative, and early analysis has noted that the BRI will now be ‘smaller and greener’. While several renewable energy projects were announced, analysis of the outcomes document shows that the dominant type of project in the BRI still appears to be infrastructure, such as railways, ports, airports and sports stadiums. And as much as Xi’s speeches at the conference repeatedly emphasised his new focus on ‘high-quality’ Belt and Road cooperation, China will still have to manage a hefty legacy portfolio of large and not-so-high-quality projects like the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka and the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor.
With close to US$1 trillion in funding granted over the years, the BRI remains a formidable tool of economic statecraft for China to pursue its foreign policy and security ambitions. But the poor attendance of world leaders at last week’s forum and the lack of international attention paid to it would be far from what Xi feels his initiative deserves.
pow4ade
No one paid attention to last week’s Belt and Road forum—and that’s bad for Xi
26 Oct 2023|Jacinta Keast
SHARE
Print This Post
With all that’s going on in the world, you could be forgiven for missing that the 10th anniversary forum of Xi Jinping’s flagship foreign policy and trade program, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), was held in Beijing in the middle of last week. Some saw the West’s involvement in conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine as creating a strategic opening for Chinese diplomacy at the forum. But that’s a misreading of China’s public diplomacy goals and a far too rosy view of how last week’s event actually went.
China wants the world to value the BRI and to view China as a legitimate leader of nations in global development. As an initiative that Xi himself proposed in 2013, its success is directly linked to his power as a leader.
Beijing saw this forum as a crucial chance to advocate for its ‘global community of shared future’ proposal. In the run-up, it released a white paper outlining how this proposal could lead to a new type of international relations that rejects the Western-led multilateral order and its emphasis on ‘universal values’. It also published a white paper on the BRI, positioning it as a core pillar of the ‘global community of shared future’ proposal. Xi’s keynote address at the conference focused on lauding the achievements of the first 10 years of the BRI and how following China’s development path through the ‘global community of shared future’ was the best way towards world peace and prosperity.
This message fell on deaf ears. Chinese state media reported that representatives from more than 140 countries attended the event, but, in fact, only 21 countries sent representatives at the head-of-state level. That’s the lowest ever attendance of heads of state at a BRI forum. Notably, the leaders of Brazil, India and South Africa—which, along with Russia and China, comprise BRICS—were absent.
In a telling contrast, Fiji’s Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka chose to make a state visit to Australia last week rather than attend the forum, sending his deputy to China instead. No bilateral BRI projects between China and Fiji were announced at the forum, whereas Australia announced a new pathway to permanent residency for citizens of the Pacific island countries and Timor-Leste. This is something China would never be able to offer the Pacific and addresses a genuine policy want from countries in the region.
China also made a public diplomacy blunder in giving Russian President Vladmir Putin top billing at the forum. Putin appeared next to Xi in the leader’s photo and was given the most important position after Xi as a keynote speaker. While we should worry about the strengthening Sino-Russian ‘no limits’ partnership, Russia isn’t even formally part of the BRI. Rather than emphasising strength and unity, giving Putin such a prominent role instead undercut China’s claims to multilateralism and anti-hegemony. That’s not to mention the image problems China has from its support of another rogue actor, the Taliban, who were invited to attend the forum and have been encouraged to join the BRI.
Many countries may have sent representatives to the forum as a way to maintain good relations with China, but not to further deepen their engagement with the BRI. With many Chinese development banks and financing institutions in attendance, countries with large BRI projects may have also used it as an opportunity to negotiate their existing financial agreements with China, rather than sign on to new deals. Indeed, Sri Lanka, which owes Chinese lenders more than US$7 billion, had its president advocating that a lack of debt relief for low-income countries posed an existential risk to the BRI.
In analysing where the BRI is going, we should look at what China does, not what it says. Major BRI projects are typically announced in an outcomes document from the forum, and an analysis of this year’s outcomes show a gap between what China says its new vision for the BRI is and what it is actually funding. Most projects in the list are not new deals and had already been announced prior to the forum. For example, the document announced that China would build the Solomon Islands’ national broadband network, although the deal was already signed more than a year ago. Similarly, China said it would construct the Kaduna–Kano railway in Nigeria, but ground was already broken on the project in mid-2021.
At the forum, Xi announced that ‘green development’ in the BRI would be a major step in the initiative, and early analysis has noted that the BRI will now be ‘smaller and greener’. While several renewable energy projects were announced, analysis of the outcomes document shows that the dominant type of project in the BRI still appears to be infrastructure, such as railways, ports, airports and sports stadiums. And as much as Xi’s speeches at the conference repeatedly emphasised his new focus on ‘high-quality’ Belt and Road cooperation, China will still have to manage a hefty legacy portfolio of large and not-so-high-quality projects like the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka and the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor.
With close to US$1 trillion in funding granted over the years, the BRI remains a formidable tool of economic statecraft for China to pursue its foreign policy and security ambitions. But the poor attendance of world leaders at last week’s forum and the lack of international attention paid to it would be far from what Xi feels his initiative deserves.
He is busy, don't stop him.
Agreed, it's a worthwhile read for a Chinese outlet. Wondering what this closing passage refers to:
It is likely that the new PR13559 will eventually be subjected to a series of harsh conditions"transfer"at AVZ.
Does it mean to obtain the ML for Roche Dure we will need to concede Carrier de Leste? If so, it works for me
The message is clear do not trust the CCP as they have ulterior motives. They talk about creating a peaceful world when their MO is war and total control.Posted by
pow4ade
No one paid attention to last week’s Belt and Road forum—and that’s bad for Xi
26 Oct 2023|Jacinta Keast
SHARE
Print This Post
With all that’s going on in the world, you could be forgiven for missing that the 10th anniversary forum of Xi Jinping’s flagship foreign policy and trade program, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), was held in Beijing in the middle of last week. Some saw the West’s involvement in conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine as creating a strategic opening for Chinese diplomacy at the forum. But that’s a misreading of China’s public diplomacy goals and a far too rosy view of how last week’s event actually went.
China wants the world to value the BRI and to view China as a legitimate leader of nations in global development. As an initiative that Xi himself proposed in 2013, its success is directly linked to his power as a leader.
Beijing saw this forum as a crucial chance to advocate for its ‘global community of shared future’ proposal. In the run-up, it released a white paper outlining how this proposal could lead to a new type of international relations that rejects the Western-led multilateral order and its emphasis on ‘universal values’. It also published a white paper on the BRI, positioning it as a core pillar of the ‘global community of shared future’ proposal. Xi’s keynote address at the conference focused on lauding the achievements of the first 10 years of the BRI and how following China’s development path through the ‘global community of shared future’ was the best way towards world peace and prosperity.
This message fell on deaf ears. Chinese state media reported that representatives from more than 140 countries attended the event, but, in fact, only 21 countries sent representatives at the head-of-state level. That’s the lowest ever attendance of heads of state at a BRI forum. Notably, the leaders of Brazil, India and South Africa—which, along with Russia and China, comprise BRICS—were absent.
In a telling contrast, Fiji’s Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka chose to make a state visit to Australia last week rather than attend the forum, sending his deputy to China instead. No bilateral BRI projects between China and Fiji were announced at the forum, whereas Australia announced a new pathway to permanent residency for citizens of the Pacific island countries and Timor-Leste. This is something China would never be able to offer the Pacific and addresses a genuine policy want from countries in the region.
China also made a public diplomacy blunder in giving Russian President Vladmir Putin top billing at the forum. Putin appeared next to Xi in the leader’s photo and was given the most important position after Xi as a keynote speaker. While we should worry about the strengthening Sino-Russian ‘no limits’ partnership, Russia isn’t even formally part of the BRI. Rather than emphasising strength and unity, giving Putin such a prominent role instead undercut China’s claims to multilateralism and anti-hegemony. That’s not to mention the image problems China has from its support of another rogue actor, the Taliban, who were invited to attend the forum and have been encouraged to join the BRI.
Many countries may have sent representatives to the forum as a way to maintain good relations with China, but not to further deepen their engagement with the BRI. With many Chinese development banks and financing institutions in attendance, countries with large BRI projects may have also used it as an opportunity to negotiate their existing financial agreements with China, rather than sign on to new deals. Indeed, Sri Lanka, which owes Chinese lenders more than US$7 billion, had its president advocating that a lack of debt relief for low-income countries posed an existential risk to the BRI.
In analysing where the BRI is going, we should look at what China does, not what it says. Major BRI projects are typically announced in an outcomes document from the forum, and an analysis of this year’s outcomes show a gap between what China says its new vision for the BRI is and what it is actually funding. Most projects in the list are not new deals and had already been announced prior to the forum. For example, the document announced that China would build the Solomon Islands’ national broadband network, although the deal was already signed more than a year ago. Similarly, China said it would construct the Kaduna–Kano railway in Nigeria, but ground was already broken on the project in mid-2021.
At the forum, Xi announced that ‘green development’ in the BRI would be a major step in the initiative, and early analysis has noted that the BRI will now be ‘smaller and greener’. While several renewable energy projects were announced, analysis of the outcomes document shows that the dominant type of project in the BRI still appears to be infrastructure, such as railways, ports, airports and sports stadiums. And as much as Xi’s speeches at the conference repeatedly emphasised his new focus on ‘high-quality’ Belt and Road cooperation, China will still have to manage a hefty legacy portfolio of large and not-so-high-quality projects like the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka and the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor.
With close to US$1 trillion in funding granted over the years, the BRI remains a formidable tool of economic statecraft for China to pursue its foreign policy and security ambitions. But the poor attendance of world leaders at last week’s forum and the lack of international attention paid to it would be far from what Xi feels his initiative deserves.
Dijon101
Regular
You going to add anything to the discussion or just be confrontational with everyone?
Bray
Regular
Carrying on like a dickhead is worse than being a troll
These two parts I find interesting.Sharing a quite balanced article out of China that a couple of the lads here tracked down .....
Manono锂矿洗牌，紫金矿业获权益再平衡 行走的石头 2023-10-24 $紫金矿业(SH601899)$ 昨日发布晚间公告，公司受邀主导世界级锂矿Manono... - 雪球
行走的石头 2023-10-24 $紫金矿业(SH601899)$ 昨日发布晚间公告，公司受邀主导世界级锂矿Manono东北部项目勘探开发。据了解，Manono锂矿PR13359探矿权已归还并登记至Cominiere（刚果矿业开发股份有限公司）名下。根据紫金与Cominiere合资协议，双方通过曼诺诺锂业持有该探矿权东北部分项目（...xueqiu.com
Published on 2023-10-25 14:19from snowball · Jiangsu
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Manono lithium mine shuffle,Zijin Mining receives equity rebalancing
Walking Stone2023-10-24
$Zijin Mining (SH601899)$ issued an evening announcement yesterday,The company was invited to lead the exploration and development of the world-class lithium mine Manono Northeast Project.It is understood,Manono lithium mine PR13359 exploration rights have been returned and registered to Cominiere(Congo Mining Development Corporation)under one's name.According to the joint venture agreement between Zijin and Cominiere,The two parties hold the northeast part of the exploration right through Manono Lithium.(Exploration Rights No. PR15775),Among them, Zijin Mining holds 61% of the equity of the joint venture.,Cominiere holds 39% interest.
It was noted that Zijin Mining, which has always been strict in information disclosure, used the following words in its announcement:"Northeast part of the mining rights project",rather than the Northeast"A certain project".alert immediately,Mining rights were split!Some friends in the industry asked about this on WeChat,I took some time out from my busy schedule to type out a few paragraphs of text..
1-Significant reshuffle and division of mining rights.The original PR13359 was split into two,Cominiere acquires flagship resource area,Zijin obtains the best prospect exploration area in Northeast China.
The original outer exploration rights of Manono’s northeast extension and southwest extension were randomly cut up.,Congolese environmental and mining consultancy to divide outer extension;AVZ only retains the external extensions after castration,And its mineral rights are surrounded by exploration blocks of the Congolese Environmental and Mining Consulting Company.
The two pictures above reflect the aftermath of the Manono incident,The mysterious operation of mineral rights changes in core areas.The original PR13359 was split into new PR13359 and PR15775,The former is owned by Cominiere,The latter is controlled and dominated by Zijin Mining through cooperative companies.The original peripheral PR4029 and PR4030 were cannibalized and divided.,AVZ currently holds only the yellow area in the picture above,Congolese environmental and mining consultancy holds green zone.
2- The flagship mining right PR13359 was taken back by the government,The discovered core lithium resources are fully controlled by Cominiere.Although the project is called Manono,However, the resources discovered by AVZ exploration are actually in the Kitotolo Pegmatite Belt.,rather than the Manono pegmatite belt.Areas where AVZ has carried out extensive exploration discoveries and submitted resource estimates in the past,Strictly limited to the lower left corner of the picture below,That is, in the Roche Dure pegmatite in the southwest area,The resource estimation results are shown in the table below.
3- PR15775 controlled by Zijin Mining does not include proven high-grade lithium ore resources,However, the exposed Manono pegmatite zone,In addition, AVZ’s past exploration has already discovered mineralization through drilling.,Exploration prospects are very good.
According to AVZ official website information,The MO17DD007 borehole constructed as early as 2017 discovered ore thickness of up to 251 meters in the Carriere de I'Este pegmatite in the Manono pegmatite belt.,Li2O grade is as high as 1.48%,Mineralization at 913 ppm tin grade.
3- Zijin Mining’s previous deal to purchase 15% of Dathcom’s shares was completed"reconciliation",The acquisition price of US$33.44 million was directly used to obtain 61% of the equity consideration of the PR15775 exploration rights project company..Zijin Mining becomes one of the foreign-funded enterprises that invested in the original Manono project,So far the only company that has received equity rebalancing.
4-Commentary and analysis of future trends of the Manono lithium mine incident:
Zijin Mining has occupied the mining news attention of Chinese people for nearly two months.,First, PNG’s Porgera gold mine won new mining rights,Then the investment in the Manono lithium mine project was rebalanced and equity repaid,Demonstrate the ability of large international mining companies to respond to and resolve national risks.
This operation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo government is quite outrageous.,Obviously there is someone behind the scenes to help;Both sides,Can advance or retreat!
Government-related transfer of 15% stake in Zijin Mining received amicable settlement and equity rebalancing payment.The core lithium ore resources discovered by the original AVZ are classified into the new PR13559 and are controlled by Cominiere,Not moving for now.One side can still continue negotiations with the Australian government or AVZ listed companies with strong international influence,On the one hand, we can still wait quietly for the outcome of the international arbitration in Paris..after all,Under strong diplomatic pressure from the Five Eyes alliance countries,The Congolese government will not make any rash decisions in the short term..This leaves a way for AVZ to regain the Roche Dure core mineral resources of the Manono project in some way in the future..
Due to settlement and equity rebalancing,Zijin Mining seems to have temporarily withdrawn from investment in the core Roche Dure lithium mine.,Of course, we do not rule out seeking investment in the future..But to some extent,Zijin Mining currently occupies a favorable track.Obtain very favorable prospecting rights,And won the development rights of hydropower stations in the region,The highway to Manono is also advancing.Zijin Mining is racing against time,If PR15775 obtains exploration findings as soon as possible,and build the mine quickly,In the future, obtaining the development rights of the core resources in the new PR13559 will occupy the first-mover advantage..
AVZ is under great pressure now!From a legal perspective,The current embarrassing situation is that the mining rights of the projects that were originally controlled have been divided and divided, leaving only the useless narrow corridor of the second ring road.,and surrounded by three peripheral rings controlled by Congolese Environmental and Mining Consulting Company.Faced with capital market shareholders again"Inadequate, timely and transparent disclosure"Waiting for prosecution.same,Today’s ASX disclosure still did not mention the latest mineral rights split and split..
The future of the Manono lithium mine remains unclear.Reconciliation of the dispute over the transfer of 15% equity of the original project company,Removes obstacles for AVZ to assert reasonable expectations of its future 66% stake.Have a premonition,The Congolese government is eager to seek political and economic support from the West,At the same time, due to political pressure from the United States and other Western countries,,It is likely that the new PR13559 will eventually be subjected to a series of harsh conditions"transfer"at AVZ.Sure enough,Zijin Mining is likely to be able to protect its interests in it
thanks for sharing the article. It offers an insightful point of view of a chinese national (i assume) that doesn't seem to be solely mouth piece propaganda.
Always good to get opposing and seemingly genuine points of views. And, The part about pressure from western countries is hopeful.
The comment at the end of the article... could that be telling of Zijin's strategy?
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Carlos Danger
Top 20
Clearly Zijin know they can't win at the ICC. That's why they made their offer for the mica infested north a year ago. Their plan is to start progressing the north with Cominiere and if needed pay Dathcom compensation for the lost rights it continues to claim. The big question is how does the DRC government see this plan and were we given a legal guarantee of keeping the north when we signed the waiver.
Given the MoM's reasoning so far, the MoP keeping her job, the promotion of CKK and AVZ only getting back in negotiations on the basis of a significant compromise of our legal rights, it doesn't seem likely that Felix sees the pride lands belonging entirely to Dathcom imo
It's beyond time for the lion to show everyone who he really is. Is he a Simba or Scar. Luckily he has such a nice watch so he knows the hour of action is here hey @TheCount ?
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