The question is which company or authority authorises e.g. environmental monitoring via Chinese tec.
In our country at least, there are constant warnings about this from the Federal Ministry for Information Security and in the relevant press.
I also remember this in the UK:
Investigations by campaign group Big Brother Watch suggest that many schools and councils across the UK are using CCTV cameras made by Chinese companies Hikvision and Dahua. Several UK government agencies also use Hikvision cameras. The companies have been criticised because China uses their devices to repress the Uyghurs. Dozens of British MPs have now called on Prime Minister Boris Johnson to ban the sale and use of surveillance equipment from Chinese companies Hikvision and Dahua ‘on ethical grounds’. The companies are already on a blacklist in the USA. British politicians warn against Hikvision and Dahua.
The web is full of this topic.
The licence alone in very practical matters runs in the western world under the strictest safety requirements. If everything goes well, they will be approved to sell this one specific certified product here. Only then does the question arise as to which customer wants to reconcile this with their policy and finally buys and implements the product.
For me, surveillance technology or any form of monitoring or recognition from Chinese tec is no competition. They have only themselves to blame. Everything for the party.
Just a quick look at a single issue here in the EU:
REPORT on the security and defence implications of China’s influence on critical infrastructure in the European Union
11.12.2023 - (
2023/2072(INI))
MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION
on the security and defence implications of China’s influence on critical infrastructure in the European Union
(
2023/2072(INI))
The European Parliament,
having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
– having regard to Title V of the Treaty on European Union, in particular Chapter Two, Section Two thereof on provisions on the common security and defence policy,
– having regard to the ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’, approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 25 March 2022,
– having regard to the Versailles Declaration, adopted at the informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government on 11 March 2022,
– having regard the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on European economic security strategy (JOIN(2023)0020),
– having regard to the Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market
[1],
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union
[2],
– having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC (Resilience of Critical Entities Directive)
[3],
– having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive)
[4],
– having regard to the Commission proposal of 15 September 2022 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 (
COM(2022)0454),
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 of 13 September 2023 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem (Chips Act)
[5],
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/XXXX of [date] of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials (Critical Raw Materials Act)
[6],
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/XXXX of [date] of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries
[7],
– having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 on a new EU-China strategy (
2021/2037(INI))
[8], inter alia aimed at strengthening the EU’s ‘trade toolbox’ to help mitigate the current imbalance in bilateral economic and trade relations between China and the EU,
– having regard to Parliament’s resolutions of 9 March 2022
[9] and of 1 June 2023 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation
[10],
– having regard to the joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank of 1 December 2021 entitled ‘The Global Gateway’ (JOIN(2021)0030),
– having regard to the Commission recommendation of 3 October 2023 on critical technology areas for the EU’s economic security for further risk assessment with Member States (C(2023)6689),
– having regard to the Council Recommendation of 8 December 2022 on a Union-wide coordinated approach to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure
[11],
– having regard to the Vilnius Summit Communiqué, issued by the NATO heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Vilnius on 11 July 2023,
– having regard to the Final Assessment Report of the NATO-EU Task Force of 29 June 2023 on the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure,
– having regard to the Joint Declaration of 10 January 2023 on EU-NATO Cooperation,
– having regard to the G7 Hiroshima Leaders’ Communiqué of 20 May 2023,
– having regard to the Council conclusions on the Revised EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) and its Action Plan of 24 October 2023,
– having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on International Trade,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0401/2023),
A. whereas the recent joint communication on a European economic security strategy focuses on minimising and managing the risks arising from certain economic flows and the EU’s dependency on authoritarian and totalitarian regimes such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the context of increased geopolitical tensions and accelerating technological shifts, while protecting free market principles from distortion by such regimes and, thereby, preserving maximum economic openness and dynamism;
B. whereas disruptions to critical infrastructure can have significant negative consequences for vital government functions, essential services for the population, economic activity as well as the security and defence of the EU; whereas it is crucial that Member States and the Commission be vigilant with regard to financial investments that foreign countries make in the operation of critical entities within the EU and the consequences that such investments could have on the ability to prevent significant disruptions;
C. whereas the Resilience of Critical Entities Directive
[12] and the NIS 2 Directive
[13] provide a comprehensive legal framework to strengthen both the physical and digital resilience of critical infrastructure, including that related to energy, transport, health, digital infrastructure, water and food;
D. whereas since the Council Recommendation of 8 December 2022 was issued, targeted actions have already been carried out to ensure a common EU response to incidents, including by strengthening coordination with NATO through the EU-NATO Task Force on the resilience of critical infrastructure embedded in the NATO-EU Structured Dialogue on Resilience;
E. whereas European ports in which Chinese state-owned companies have stakes handle more than 10 % of Europe’s total shipping container capacity; whereas the three largest Chinese shareholders in European ports have assets in almost half the ports (14 out of 29) that are located either close to naval bases or provide logistical support to NATO forces, greatly increasing the risk of espionage;
F. whereas the coercive policies and the growing assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including its increasingly aggressive stance towards Taiwan and the aggressive posture assumed in the South China Sea, as well as the social and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine have exposed the EU’s vulnerabilities and reaffirmed the need to ‘de-risk’ its relations vis-à-vis the PRC and other undemocratic third countries;
G. whereas the Chinese government has demonstrated that it is willing to weaponise its overwhelming control of global rare earth supplies for political ends and to obtain unfair economic concessions and advantages;
H. whereas China is restricting non-Chinese companies from participating in infrastructure projects on account of the security risks and is putting forward legislation with regard to critical infrastructure, such as the Critical Information Infrastructure Security Protection Regulations; whereas China is involved in constructing EU-funded infrastructure in various EU Member States; whereas pursuant to international commitments, it is possible for the EU and the Member States to adopt restrictive measures relating to foreign direct investment (FDI) on the grounds of security or public order, subject to certain requirements; whereas in 2021-22, China engaged in an economic blockade against Lithuania in response to Lithuania’s decision to withdraw from the Belt and Road Initiative and to open a Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania, resulting in the Commission’s request to establish a panel at the World Trade Organisation to examine the legality of China’s trade restrictions against Lithuanian and EU exports containing Lithuanian content, and whereas this demonstrates China’s assertiveness in targeting specific EU countries, not only through direct economic coercion, but also through the threat of secondary sanctions;
I. whereas the spread of China’s digital authoritarianism and mass surveillance continues to intensify both within China and beyond, targeting democratic institutions and societies, and it risks establishing a new international order that would endanger freedom and democracy around the world; whereas a large number of Chinese students study in Member States’ universities, especially in the field of dual-use technologies, potentially leading in some cases to a high risk of espionage; whereas former European fighter pilots have been employed by the Chinese army and such recruitment creates a serious risk of transfer of critical information putting the military-strategic interests of the countries concerned at risk; whereas Chinese ambitions are growing in strategic areas such as AI, cloud computing, semiconductors, or hardware; whereas these instruments, particularly AI, could be developed for military purposes, driving the next revolution in military affairs;
J. whereas China’s acquisition of critical infrastructure, especially within the EU and in its neighbourhood, including the Western Balkans and Africa poses an increasing multi-dimensional risk to the EU’s security;
K. whereas China’s national security related legislation, such as the 2015 National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China, requires citizens and organisations to provide support and assistance to the PRC’s public security, state security or military bodies;
L. whereas the Sino-Russian strategic partnership formalised with the Joint Statement ‘on the international relations entering a new era and the global sustainable development’ of 4 February 2022 continues to grow, including in the areas of technology and military know-how and capability transfers, posing an increasing threat to European security;
The core of the problem: understanding China’s military-civil fusion strategy
1. Underlines that China’s military-civil fusion (MCF) strategy is a state-led, state-directed programme and plans to instrumentalise all levers of state and commercial power to strengthen and support the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its armed wing, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), particularly by acquiring and diverting the world’s cutting-edge technologies, with the objective of strengthening the totalitarian regime and achieving military dominance;
2. Considers that China’s party-driven political system and economy often require private companies to align their commercial interests with the CCP, including its military activities, repression, influence and political interference activities; notes that CCP party cells inside private companies are commonly used as tools of direct party control; highlights that, consequentially, Chinese companies’ international activities support the CCP’s goals of expanding its influence in third countries, undermining geopolitical rivals and increasing China’s influence;
3. Believes that MCF must be understood in a larger geopolitical, economic and strategic context, taking into account its interconnections with other initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the Digital Silk Road (including Made in China 2025, China Standards 2035), the Global Security Initiative, Dual Circulation strategy) and China’s increasing assertiveness and aggressive posturing abroad; believes that the ultimate aim of MCF is to advance the party-state’s long-term strategic goal to become the world’s leading power in terms of political influence, economic capacities, technological dominance and military might, and to undermine the rules-based international order;
4. Recalls that achieving primacy in science and technology has been one of the CCP’s top priorities in recent years and that the CCP’s MCF strategy incentivises the sharing of research and development results between market-oriented and Chinese defence industries; stresses the repeated warnings by intelligence agencies against the risks of economic dependence, espionage and sabotage caused by the economic presence of entities from certain non-EU countries, in particular China, in critical infrastructure and strategic sectors across the EU; is, in this regard, concerned by the political pressure asserted in the approval of specific Chinese investments into critical infrastructure, as in the case of the German government’s decision to agree to the acquisition of a stake at the port of Hamburg by COSCO, contrary to the advice of the competent institutions;
Consequences of the PRC’s military-civil fusion strategy
5. Warns of the risk of Chinese companies having any involvement with EU strategic assets, especially those companies that have direct or indirect links to China’s political-military or intelligence systems; underlines, in this regard, its concern that technology and technological expertise used in civilian activities, particularly in the economic sphere, continues to be transferred to China’s military, increasing the PLA’s ability to develop the next generation of military technology, which may be used to coerce partners in Asia and around the world; urges EU Member States to increase regulatory oversight and introduce specific background checks over individuals and legal entities with direct ties to the Chinese government;
6. Is concerned that that 98 % of EU demand for rare earths is being met by the PRC; emphasises that China produces 70 % of the world’s batteries (hosting three of the top five battery manufacturing giants), accounts for 60 % of global aluminium production and 75 % of silicon production, as well as 94 % the global production of gallium and around 60 % of germanium production, and is the leading refiner of 60 % of lithium and 70 % of copper processing and produces 84 % of the world’s nickel and 85 % of its cobalt; underlines that Chinese mining companies are active in Serbia (copper and gold), the Democratic Republic of Congo (cobalt), Indonesia (nickel) and Chile and Australia (lithium) and that its quasi-monopoly in the production and processing of these critical commodities creates crucial dependencies and therefore presents not only an acute geopolitical challenge for the EU, but also a huge risk for Europe’s defence and other key industrial sectors as well as its open strategic autonomy and European economic security strategy;
7. Welcomes, in this regard the Commission proposal for the Critical Raw Materials Act and calls for the speedy implementation of its goals in order to strengthen the EU’s supply chain resilience; recalls that critical raw materials are essential to the security and defence sector as well as for the success of the EU’s digital and green transitions; calls on the Commission and the Member States, in coordination with industry stakeholders to implement the decision to gradually reduce the dependence on China by diversifying the sources of critical raw minerals and rare earth elements, establishing strategic partnerships with reliable third countries with a view to ensuring a secure and reliable supply of critical raw materials; urges the EU to assist Member States in developing projects that will aim for greater independence from Chinese production;
8. Strongly advocates for the diversification of suppliers and partners in critical infrastructure initiatives to reduce the vulnerability to external influences, ensuring that reliance on any single source is minimised;
9. Is concerned that privately owned undersea cables provided by Chinese companies, such as HMN Technologies, a PLA cyber intelligence–affiliated entity, are used to support EU and Member States’ diplomatic and military communications; expresses its grave concern over the undersea data cable systems operated by Chinese company HMN Technologies, which connect EU Member States’ territories and the Indo-Pacific region, including Member State and NATO military bases, creating security vulnerabilities as regards cybersecurity, underwater surveillance, data collection, and gathering of intelligence; in this regard, is further concerned by the sale of a Dutch company, the backbone of Estonia’s internet infrastructure, to a Chinese company linked to the PLA; highlights the need for a joint effort among the Member States to prevent similar cases;
10. Recalls the need to perform a thorough evaluation of the EU institutions’ information security infrastructure and services, in particular regarding classified communications between the institutions and missions and operations abroad; recalls that the full supply chain should be taken into account to ensure that the companies do not have any direct or indirect links with the PRC; calls for specific provisions in EU institutions procurements procedures to limit the risk of interference, including the acquisition, maintenance or vetting by a third party;
14. Notes that Chinese companies are already leaders in key technologies used in sectors such as 5G wireless infrastructure, drones, batteries, hypersonic missiles, solar and wind energy, as well as cryptocurrency; expresses its concerns over the uses of these technologies and the dependencies they create; notes, in this regard, that 100 % of the 5G RAN in Cyprus is composed of Chinese equipment, and 59 % in the case of Germany; stresses that this runs counter to the EU’s ‘5G security toolbox’ guidelines to mitigate security risks in networks and calls on the Council and the Commission to exclude the use of equipment and software from manufacturers based in the PRC in core network functions; recalls that Huawei has been participating in 11 projects under Horizon Europe until June 2023, thus receiving EUR 3.89 million of funding in total; therefore, urges the EU and European institutions to carry out a systematic screening of Chinese companies benefiting directly or indirectly from European programmes of strategic importance for the EU and, where necessary, terminate their participation; furthermore, calls on the Commission to propose additional security standards for Chinese suppliers of 5G and the next generation 6G network;
15. Considers the TikTok app, owned by Chinese conglomerate ByteDance, to be in breach of the European data privacy framework, making it a potential risk and a source of Chinese-backed disinformation; welcomes the decision of EU institutions and those of several EU Member States to suspend the use of the TikTok application on corporate devices, as well as personal devices enrolled in the institutions’ mobile device services;
...
continues to point 34, followed by the opinion, which comprises another 24 points.
by SLG Syndication
I'm already giving the answer in advance:
Another success for 
We are grateful for this important collaboration and look forward to carrying out this innovative initiative together with such prestigious partners! 
