Got it
AVZ Discussion 2022
- Thread starter GazDix
- Start date
Got it
Mute22
Regular
Case Details | ICSID
Latest Development:
April 14, 2025 -
The Respondent files further observations on the request to address the objections to jurisdiction as a preliminary question.
Last edited:
Rechnerhand
Regular
Just for the record who made it possible these 2 steps by the Respondent happened in 2025 ...
Carlos Danger
Top 20
Someone let Jens know that Cominiere is a claimant and Zijin aren’t involved
As for sovereign citizens it makes far more legal sense than describing a land full of people as ‘terra nullius’ imo
TheGermanOne
Member
The lawyers of the drc are the same of the zijin case at the icc! If you didn't know...
Spikerama
Regular
No it''s the other way around.
Claimants:
- AVZ International Pty Ltd. (Australia)
- Dathcom Mining SA (Democratic Republic of the Congo)
- Green Lithium Holdings Pte Ltd. (Singapore)
- Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
If you are referring to ICSID
Spikerama
Regular
Well they certainly have a laugh and a hoot every time they hear you say something like that.
Samus
Top 20
Yes I'm sure the fuckwits of zijin are here reading my every word. If they are they can get fucked!
Spikerama
Regular
Maybe not them but people connected to them or at least low-life sociopaths who revel and take glee or enjoyment from your pain.
They love it.
Better off letting them go thirsty in my opinion.
Samus
Top 20
They know we're suffering, the toilets and hoots of the world can get fucked too.
I hope at least we can share our exasperation along with fellow shareholders on this one platform that isn't infested with assholes.
Spikerama
Regular
Of course you can mate. We all know we can cry and exasperate and post as many memes as we like if it makes us feel better. I'm just expressing an opinion, that's all.
Samus
Top 20
Spikerama
Regular
Nah, I prefer words. I did love the Young Ones though.
Rechnerhand
Regular
The Guardian view on Donald Trump’s Congo deal: mineral riches for protection
Faced with regional chaos and shrinking options, Kinshasa seeks terms of trade that echo the old extractive order in modern disguise
The vilest scramble for loot that has ever disfigured the history of human conscience” is how Joseph Conrad described colonial-era concessions granted to private companies for Congo’s natural resources in Heart of Darkness. Under Donald Trump, that scramble may be back. If news reports are right, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is offering the US a blunt deal: minerals for military help – a slice of sovereignty traded for a shot at stability.
The concern is this isn’t a return, it’s a sequel. For three decades, Washington supported Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, a cold war ally and brutal dictator who looted the Congo until his 1997 fall. That history of power politics still casts a long shadow. The Trump administration openly favours muscle over diplomacy. Fadhel Kaboub, an associate professor of economics at Denison University, notes that Biden-era talk of partnering for clean energy has been shelved, with the US driven less by green goals than by copper and cobalt for missiles and microchips.
The logic is bleak but clear. Since 1996, the Congo’s wars have drawn in foreign armies and proxies, leaving over 5.5 million dead. The DRC faces a worsening security crisis driven by armed groups like M23, allegedly backed by Rwanda and other regional powers. Western governments lament the violence, but focus on securing access to minerals vital to their industries. Kinshasa, seeing appeals to multilateral justice achieve little, has turned to dealmaking. If dependency is inevitable, it might as well be leveraged.
The DRC’s leadership is not naive. They know Mr Trump sees Africa not as a partner but as a warehouse of strategic materials, and Ukraine as proof that he will turn weakness into American gain. They know China won’t send troops – citing non-interference – even as its firms dominate Congolese mining. With Russia and Gulf states offering assistance, Kinshasa pushes for US bases to guard “strategic resources” – like cobalt, 70% of which comes from the DRC and is essential to smartphones and Nato’s defence industry. Congo may want boots; Washington prefers business.
The proposed deal with the US seems desperate and strategic: security support in exchange for mining rights. Don’t call it protection money. After Mr Trump’s Africa envoy signalled a deal was coming, the DRC repatriated three Americans tied to a failed coup, and a tin mine, which is controlled by US investors, began reopening as M23 rebels pulled back – a fragile win in a volatile landscape. Kinshasa hopes either to have Washington broker a peace that forces the rebels into retreat or to gain the firepower to crush them outright.
It might also unlock IMF funding and widen access to western capital markets. But at what cost? The likeliest outcome is that the DRC will receive just enough to remain dependent. Its mineral sector will be dominated by foreign firms, its fiscal autonomy eroded by conditional loans and its economy locked into the old pattern of subservience – supplier of cheap inputs, consumer of expensive outputs.
Calling this colonialism isn’t quite right. Empires ruled by decree, with no pretence of consent. Today’s coercion is more subtle: a sovereign state cornered, at a weak moment, into accepting colonial-style terms without soldiers or flags. The tools are different – security deals, trade exemptions, private investment. But the logic is familiar. The irony is that this is being pursued voluntarily by a government with few alternatives. What will history say about that?
Faced with regional chaos and shrinking options, Kinshasa seeks terms of trade that echo the old extractive order in modern disguise
The vilest scramble for loot that has ever disfigured the history of human conscience” is how Joseph Conrad described colonial-era concessions granted to private companies for Congo’s natural resources in Heart of Darkness. Under Donald Trump, that scramble may be back. If news reports are right, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is offering the US a blunt deal: minerals for military help – a slice of sovereignty traded for a shot at stability.
The concern is this isn’t a return, it’s a sequel. For three decades, Washington supported Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, a cold war ally and brutal dictator who looted the Congo until his 1997 fall. That history of power politics still casts a long shadow. The Trump administration openly favours muscle over diplomacy. Fadhel Kaboub, an associate professor of economics at Denison University, notes that Biden-era talk of partnering for clean energy has been shelved, with the US driven less by green goals than by copper and cobalt for missiles and microchips.
The logic is bleak but clear. Since 1996, the Congo’s wars have drawn in foreign armies and proxies, leaving over 5.5 million dead. The DRC faces a worsening security crisis driven by armed groups like M23, allegedly backed by Rwanda and other regional powers. Western governments lament the violence, but focus on securing access to minerals vital to their industries. Kinshasa, seeing appeals to multilateral justice achieve little, has turned to dealmaking. If dependency is inevitable, it might as well be leveraged.
The DRC’s leadership is not naive. They know Mr Trump sees Africa not as a partner but as a warehouse of strategic materials, and Ukraine as proof that he will turn weakness into American gain. They know China won’t send troops – citing non-interference – even as its firms dominate Congolese mining. With Russia and Gulf states offering assistance, Kinshasa pushes for US bases to guard “strategic resources” – like cobalt, 70% of which comes from the DRC and is essential to smartphones and Nato’s defence industry. Congo may want boots; Washington prefers business.
The proposed deal with the US seems desperate and strategic: security support in exchange for mining rights. Don’t call it protection money. After Mr Trump’s Africa envoy signalled a deal was coming, the DRC repatriated three Americans tied to a failed coup, and a tin mine, which is controlled by US investors, began reopening as M23 rebels pulled back – a fragile win in a volatile landscape. Kinshasa hopes either to have Washington broker a peace that forces the rebels into retreat or to gain the firepower to crush them outright.
It might also unlock IMF funding and widen access to western capital markets. But at what cost? The likeliest outcome is that the DRC will receive just enough to remain dependent. Its mineral sector will be dominated by foreign firms, its fiscal autonomy eroded by conditional loans and its economy locked into the old pattern of subservience – supplier of cheap inputs, consumer of expensive outputs.
Calling this colonialism isn’t quite right. Empires ruled by decree, with no pretence of consent. Today’s coercion is more subtle: a sovereign state cornered, at a weak moment, into accepting colonial-style terms without soldiers or flags. The tools are different – security deals, trade exemptions, private investment. But the logic is familiar. The irony is that this is being pursued voluntarily by a government with few alternatives. What will history say about that?
Carlos Danger
Top 20
I'm aware. Doesn't mean Zijin are a party to the ICSID case. In fact the only connection Zijin have to the ICSID case is through their joint venture Manono Lithium that the ICSID refer to as a 'third party to the proceedings' if you don't know...
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