not exactly a good sign for Tshisekedi to make a visit to Beijing just four months out from when official electioneering usually kicks off.
But who knows what the strategy is since DRC is at the centre of a power struggle between Washington and Beijing.
my impression is, that inside the contradictions between the IGF hard line (basic governance) and the mysterious resistance to true political fall out that should be a consequence of outing corruption, is that Tshisekedi needs above all loyalty more than anything to keep his political Union intact as the country moves to election mode
.
I may miss some of the intricacies to how Tshisekedi is encumbered or compromised but I think considering that IGF did what it did it did so knowing it’s throat would be protected, is clear as daylight.
Further, to weaken Chinese hegemony (by revisiting previous regime contracts) means to weaken the old brigade, which by the way, are still there, Mupande, one of the most obvious ‘barnacles’ yet to be ‘scraped.’ So, Tshisekedi is likely heading to Beijing on invitation. Beijing seems to have influence and something has to be brokered I suspect. The biggest piece would be the US proposal for EVs. And what Beijing can do for Tshisekedi.
Other than that I don’t know, as the Secretary of State Pompeo (once CIA elite always CIA elite) ordained Tshisekedi
4 years ago. How does the power politics work has me mystified. There appears no return to heavy hand days of Mobutu.
But US is funding projects in DRC. Even the Japanese are turning up.
Diversity is key for Congolese people.
Perhaps the Congolese don’t yet get how strategic Manono is. What if the Chinese get it.
What does that do for Australian lithium?