With his track record predicting where this is going I'd say it's a positive sign.
Time will tell.
AVZ Discussion 2022
- Thread starter GazDix
- Start date
Time will tell.
Who said that ? What's the source ?
Tedstaples1
Emerged
Attachments
Tedstaples1
Emerged
He seems like a muppet, wouldn’t worry about it
Schnitzelfresser
Regular
In the past nothing came to reality what he told us so I am chilled, but anyway it is not helping him to sell his shares that he pretend to know more than others.
Two months ago he was claiming it would be sold by Christmas despite official announcements indicating we should not expect any updates on the situation until end of February. He's probably disappointed and in a weak emotional state right now due to his own foolish expectations and the inevitable disappointed he set himself and others up for.
He knows nothing more than the rest of us do and with four parties looking at buying us out right now I expect he's making a poor decision selling prematurely.
Skar
Regular
I think there has been a fundamental shift where China has established its EV and battery dominance and with the change in US policy seeking to establish alternate supply chains, it no longer makes sense for China to suppress or hide the true cost... think about this, converters were operating at paper losses, they had their own mines and were still buying international ore.
The latest rockstock video dissects it well. Could be insanely ludicrous with ESS taking off, could be a blip and China will start up all the lepidolite mining again.
Either way, I'll be taking profit and thumbing my nose at gains once pricing stops making sense.
Who are the four?
If memory serves me correctly one of the people here asked at the last agm and stated to have been told 3 other parties not including GoBald. The other parties were not named and the account cannot be verified.
So pretty much as Xerof says above.
No disrespect to the original poster; I forget who it was but am happy to accept the statement at face value as they gave a decent summary of the agm and I don't have any reason to doubt their sincerity.
(This post edited to remove a YouTube link because it kept linking the wrong video for some reason.)
I should add that the basis of the agm question about additional parties besides KoBold is the official AVZ announcement dated 21/07/2025. Only the "3 besides KoBold" comment is hearsay.
Winenut
GO AVZ!!!!
Carrotdick, Dudbrook, Hugelips and GoBald
I was having a chat with Grok and it mentioned 'lithium at Manono' so I asked it why. Nothing we don't already know but nice to hear it remains positive (bit like me). Apologies for the amount of text, anyone who doesn't like reading can just skip to the end.
MY GROK PROMPT: Has the Democratic Republic of Congo provided the initial list of mineral assets to the United States under the Strategic Partnership Agreement?
GROK ANSWER:
Yes, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has provided (or is required to have provided) the initial list of mineral assets to the United States under the Strategic Partnership Agreement. The Strategic Partnership Agreement between the United States and the DRC was signed in early December 2025 (around December 4, 2025, based on multiple reports, including announcements tied to a broader peace framework with Rwanda hosted by the US).A key provision in the agreement's text (published on the US Department of State website) states:"The DRC shall designate an initial list of critical mineral assets, gold assets and unlicensed exploration areas as part of the Strategic Asset Reserve (SAR) and shall provide this list to the JSC established pursuant to Article VI of this Agreement within thirty (30) days of the entry into force of this Agreement."
Given the agreement's entry into force in early December 2025, the 30-day deadline would have fallen in early January 2026 or earlier (depending on the exact effective date). As of the current date (January 13, 2026), this deadline has passed. No public reports indicate any delay, non-compliance, or controversy regarding the submission of this initial list. Subsequent developments, such as US follow-up investments (e.g., the US International Development Finance Corporation's expressed interest in stakes in joint ventures for marketing Congolese copper, cobalt, and other minerals announced shortly after the signing), suggest the partnership mechanisms—including the Joint Steering Committee (JSC) and Strategic Asset Reserve (SAR) processes—are proceeding as outlined. This agreement forms part of broader US efforts to secure access to DRC's critical minerals (copper, cobalt, lithium, gold, etc.) amid geopolitical competition, particularly with China, and is linked to regional peace and stability initiatives. For reference, the full agreement text is available on the US State Department site, and related coverage from sources like Reuters highlights ongoing implementation steps post-signing. If new developments emerge after mid-January 2026, they could provide further confirmation, but based on available information, the initial list obligation has been fulfilled per the timeline.
MY GROK PROMPT: Details on specific mineral assets listed
GROK ANSWER: As of January 13, 2026, the specific details of the initial list of mineral assets designated by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) for the Strategic Asset Reserve (SAR) under the U.S.-DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement (signed December 4, 2025) have not been publicly disclosed or officially announced in available sources.Key Details from the AgreementThe full text of the agreement, published by the U.S. Department of State, requires the DRC to
esignate an initial list of critical mineral assets, gold assets, and unlicensed exploration areas as part of the SAR.
Provide this list to the Joint Steering Committee (JSC) within 30 days of the agreement's entry into force (which occurred in early December 2025, making the deadline early January 2026).
The SAR is intended to prioritize transparency, improved governance, and U.S. companies' right of first offer on related projects (known as SAR Projects, which can include concessions, exploration, development, or extraction stages). Additional assets can be added later by the DRC, with potential input from the U.S. However, no public releases, announcements from the State Department, DRC government, or major news outlets (such as Reuters or Bloomberg) have revealed the exact assets, sites, concessions, or locations included in this initial list. Coverage focuses on the framework, objectives, and broader implications rather than granular specifics. Types of Minerals and Assets Likely Involved While the precise list remains confidential (likely due to commercial sensitivity, ongoing JSC discussions, or security considerations), reporting and analysis indicate the SAR targets high-priority resources from the U.S. critical minerals list that the DRC is known to possess in abundance: Copper and cobalt — The DRC's flagship resources, central to global EV battery and tech supply chains.
Lithium, tantalum, tin, tungsten, niobium, manganese, zinc, germanium, and others.
Gold — Explicitly included, often linked to artisanal mining and conflict financing concerns in eastern DRC.
These align with the DRC's vast reserves (estimated at trillions in value), particularly in the southeastern copper-cobalt belt (e.g., around Kolwezi) and exploration zones. Why Details Are Not Public YetThe list was submitted privately to the JSC (a bilateral body with equal U.S.-DRC representation).
Implementation is ongoing, with U.S. follow-up investments (e.g., via the International Development Finance Corporation in copper/cobalt marketing and infrastructure like the Lobito Corridor) suggesting progress without public asset disclosure.
Some commentary notes potential inclusion of unlicensed or high-value exploration areas, possibly in contested regions, but this remains speculative.
If new information emerges (e.g., via official announcements or leaks), it could specify projects like existing concessions, greenfield sites, or areas tied to ongoing developments (e.g., lithium at Manono or copper-cobalt belts). For now, the focus remains on the strategic framework rather than named assets. The agreement's text is available on the U.S. State Department website for full reference.
MY GROK PROMPT: Why do you think 'lithium at Manono' could be specified?
GROK ANSWER: I mentioned lithium at Manono as a plausible example of a specific mineral asset that could be included (or referenced) in the DRC's initial list for the Strategic Asset Reserve (SAR) under the U.S.-DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement for several well-substantiated reasons, based on the project's profile and recent geopolitical/mining developments.Why Manono Stands Out as a High-Profile CandidateManono is widely recognized as one of the world's largest undeveloped hard-rock lithium deposits, with estimated resources in the hundreds of millions of tonnes (e.g., figures around 400–669 million tonnes at grades of ~1.6% Li₂O in various reports). Lithium is explicitly a critical mineral on the U.S. list, and the DRC holds significant global reserves of it—making projects like this highly strategic in the context of diversifying supply chains away from Chinese dominance.
Key factors that make it a logical fit for the SAR (which targets critical mineral assets, gold assets, and unlicensed exploration areas):Geopolitical and Investment Momentum in 2025 —
The project has seen intense international interest and U.S.-linked involvement. In May 2025, KoBold Metals (a U.S.-based company backed by investors like Bill Gates and Jeff Bezos) reached agreements to acquire stakes/interests in Manono, including plans for over $1 billion in investment to develop portions of the deposit and bring lithium to Western markets. This aligns directly with the agreement's goals of facilitating greater U.S. person/company investment in DRC mining, improving transparency, and securing reliable critical mineral flows.
Timing and Strategic Relevance to the Agreement — The U.S.-DRC partnership (signed December 2025) emphasizes critical minerals like lithium for energy transition and defense purposes. Manono's development ties into broader U.S. efforts (e.g., via peace frameworks with Rwanda and initiatives like the Lobito Corridor) to counter China's strong position in DRC resources. Reports from mid-2025 onward highlight Manono as a flagship example of emerging American investment in Congolese lithium, often in the same context as the partnership negotiations.
Potential for Inclusion as an "Unlicensed Exploration Area" or High-Value Asset — The deposit has a complex, contested history (involving prior Australian firm AVZ Minerals, Chinese Zijin Mining joint ventures with state-owned Cominière, permit revocations, arbitrations, and overlapping claims). Parts of it (especially northeastern/greenfield sections or southern portions) have involved unresolved licensing, joint ventures, or exploration rights that could qualify under the SAR's scope for unlicensed areas. Even with Zijin's plans for production starting in early 2026 (Q1 commissioning targeted for mid-2026), the project's scale and disputes make it a prime candidate for designation to prioritize transparent, U.S.-friendly development paths.
Caveats and Current Status: No official public disclosure of the initial SAR list (submitted to the Joint Steering Committee by early January 2026) has named specific sites like Manono. The list was provided privately per the agreement's terms, and details remain confidential—likely for commercial sensitivity, ongoing negotiations, or security reasons.That said, Manono's prominence in U.S.-DRC mineral diplomacy (including KoBold's high-profile entry) makes it one of the most frequently cited examples in discussions of potential SAR-eligible assets. If future announcements or JSC outcomes reveal more, Manono would be among the first places analysts look, given its symbolic value in the push for diversified, Western-aligned critical mineral supply. This is why I highlighted it as an illustrative possibility rather than a confirmed inclusion.
MY GROK PROMPT: Has the Democratic Republic of Congo provided the initial list of mineral assets to the United States under the Strategic Partnership Agreement?
GROK ANSWER:
Yes, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has provided (or is required to have provided) the initial list of mineral assets to the United States under the Strategic Partnership Agreement. The Strategic Partnership Agreement between the United States and the DRC was signed in early December 2025 (around December 4, 2025, based on multiple reports, including announcements tied to a broader peace framework with Rwanda hosted by the US).A key provision in the agreement's text (published on the US Department of State website) states:"The DRC shall designate an initial list of critical mineral assets, gold assets and unlicensed exploration areas as part of the Strategic Asset Reserve (SAR) and shall provide this list to the JSC established pursuant to Article VI of this Agreement within thirty (30) days of the entry into force of this Agreement."
Given the agreement's entry into force in early December 2025, the 30-day deadline would have fallen in early January 2026 or earlier (depending on the exact effective date). As of the current date (January 13, 2026), this deadline has passed. No public reports indicate any delay, non-compliance, or controversy regarding the submission of this initial list. Subsequent developments, such as US follow-up investments (e.g., the US International Development Finance Corporation's expressed interest in stakes in joint ventures for marketing Congolese copper, cobalt, and other minerals announced shortly after the signing), suggest the partnership mechanisms—including the Joint Steering Committee (JSC) and Strategic Asset Reserve (SAR) processes—are proceeding as outlined. This agreement forms part of broader US efforts to secure access to DRC's critical minerals (copper, cobalt, lithium, gold, etc.) amid geopolitical competition, particularly with China, and is linked to regional peace and stability initiatives. For reference, the full agreement text is available on the US State Department site, and related coverage from sources like Reuters highlights ongoing implementation steps post-signing. If new developments emerge after mid-January 2026, they could provide further confirmation, but based on available information, the initial list obligation has been fulfilled per the timeline.
MY GROK PROMPT: Details on specific mineral assets listed
GROK ANSWER: As of January 13, 2026, the specific details of the initial list of mineral assets designated by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) for the Strategic Asset Reserve (SAR) under the U.S.-DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement (signed December 4, 2025) have not been publicly disclosed or officially announced in available sources.Key Details from the AgreementThe full text of the agreement, published by the U.S. Department of State, requires the DRC to
esignate an initial list of critical mineral assets, gold assets, and unlicensed exploration areas as part of the SAR.Provide this list to the Joint Steering Committee (JSC) within 30 days of the agreement's entry into force (which occurred in early December 2025, making the deadline early January 2026).
The SAR is intended to prioritize transparency, improved governance, and U.S. companies' right of first offer on related projects (known as SAR Projects, which can include concessions, exploration, development, or extraction stages). Additional assets can be added later by the DRC, with potential input from the U.S. However, no public releases, announcements from the State Department, DRC government, or major news outlets (such as Reuters or Bloomberg) have revealed the exact assets, sites, concessions, or locations included in this initial list. Coverage focuses on the framework, objectives, and broader implications rather than granular specifics. Types of Minerals and Assets Likely Involved While the precise list remains confidential (likely due to commercial sensitivity, ongoing JSC discussions, or security considerations), reporting and analysis indicate the SAR targets high-priority resources from the U.S. critical minerals list that the DRC is known to possess in abundance: Copper and cobalt — The DRC's flagship resources, central to global EV battery and tech supply chains.
Lithium, tantalum, tin, tungsten, niobium, manganese, zinc, germanium, and others.
Gold — Explicitly included, often linked to artisanal mining and conflict financing concerns in eastern DRC.
These align with the DRC's vast reserves (estimated at trillions in value), particularly in the southeastern copper-cobalt belt (e.g., around Kolwezi) and exploration zones. Why Details Are Not Public YetThe list was submitted privately to the JSC (a bilateral body with equal U.S.-DRC representation).
Implementation is ongoing, with U.S. follow-up investments (e.g., via the International Development Finance Corporation in copper/cobalt marketing and infrastructure like the Lobito Corridor) suggesting progress without public asset disclosure.
Some commentary notes potential inclusion of unlicensed or high-value exploration areas, possibly in contested regions, but this remains speculative.
If new information emerges (e.g., via official announcements or leaks), it could specify projects like existing concessions, greenfield sites, or areas tied to ongoing developments (e.g., lithium at Manono or copper-cobalt belts). For now, the focus remains on the strategic framework rather than named assets. The agreement's text is available on the U.S. State Department website for full reference.
MY GROK PROMPT: Why do you think 'lithium at Manono' could be specified?
GROK ANSWER: I mentioned lithium at Manono as a plausible example of a specific mineral asset that could be included (or referenced) in the DRC's initial list for the Strategic Asset Reserve (SAR) under the U.S.-DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement for several well-substantiated reasons, based on the project's profile and recent geopolitical/mining developments.Why Manono Stands Out as a High-Profile CandidateManono is widely recognized as one of the world's largest undeveloped hard-rock lithium deposits, with estimated resources in the hundreds of millions of tonnes (e.g., figures around 400–669 million tonnes at grades of ~1.6% Li₂O in various reports). Lithium is explicitly a critical mineral on the U.S. list, and the DRC holds significant global reserves of it—making projects like this highly strategic in the context of diversifying supply chains away from Chinese dominance.
Key factors that make it a logical fit for the SAR (which targets critical mineral assets, gold assets, and unlicensed exploration areas):Geopolitical and Investment Momentum in 2025 —
The project has seen intense international interest and U.S.-linked involvement. In May 2025, KoBold Metals (a U.S.-based company backed by investors like Bill Gates and Jeff Bezos) reached agreements to acquire stakes/interests in Manono, including plans for over $1 billion in investment to develop portions of the deposit and bring lithium to Western markets. This aligns directly with the agreement's goals of facilitating greater U.S. person/company investment in DRC mining, improving transparency, and securing reliable critical mineral flows.
Timing and Strategic Relevance to the Agreement — The U.S.-DRC partnership (signed December 2025) emphasizes critical minerals like lithium for energy transition and defense purposes. Manono's development ties into broader U.S. efforts (e.g., via peace frameworks with Rwanda and initiatives like the Lobito Corridor) to counter China's strong position in DRC resources. Reports from mid-2025 onward highlight Manono as a flagship example of emerging American investment in Congolese lithium, often in the same context as the partnership negotiations.
Potential for Inclusion as an "Unlicensed Exploration Area" or High-Value Asset — The deposit has a complex, contested history (involving prior Australian firm AVZ Minerals, Chinese Zijin Mining joint ventures with state-owned Cominière, permit revocations, arbitrations, and overlapping claims). Parts of it (especially northeastern/greenfield sections or southern portions) have involved unresolved licensing, joint ventures, or exploration rights that could qualify under the SAR's scope for unlicensed areas. Even with Zijin's plans for production starting in early 2026 (Q1 commissioning targeted for mid-2026), the project's scale and disputes make it a prime candidate for designation to prioritize transparent, U.S.-friendly development paths.
Caveats and Current Status: No official public disclosure of the initial SAR list (submitted to the Joint Steering Committee by early January 2026) has named specific sites like Manono. The list was provided privately per the agreement's terms, and details remain confidential—likely for commercial sensitivity, ongoing negotiations, or security reasons.That said, Manono's prominence in U.S.-DRC mineral diplomacy (including KoBold's high-profile entry) makes it one of the most frequently cited examples in discussions of potential SAR-eligible assets. If future announcements or JSC outcomes reveal more, Manono would be among the first places analysts look, given its symbolic value in the push for diversified, Western-aligned critical mineral supply. This is why I highlighted it as an illustrative possibility rather than a confirmed inclusion.
Victor Lee
Emerged
This group was created by Victor, a financial expert with over thirty years of investment experience in the stock market. It aims to facilitate direct and effective communication and mutual learning among Australian investors. The group will provide the latest market analysis and excellent trading advice. We hope to help group members accumulate wealth faster in the stock market.
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