A White House-brokered agreement promises regional calm and economic integration, but success depends on dislodging rebels and securing mining rights
www.africa-confidential.com
11 Jul 2025
A White House-brokered agreement promises regional calm and economic integration, but success depends on dislodging rebels and securing mining rights
Speaking at the White House on 27 June, during the signing of a new peace agreement by the Rwandan and Congolese foreign ministers, President
Donald Trump declared that no previous United States president had attempted to broker peace between Rwanda and Congo-Kinshasa – and that none could have succeeded as he had. Vice-President
JD Vance, Secretary of State
Marco Rubio and US Africa Envoy
Massad Boulos all echoed the sentiment (Dispatches 6/5/25,
Ceasefire, minerals deal and troops out as peace deal takes shape).
Congolese Foreign Minister
Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner and her Rwandan counterpart
Olivier Nduhungirehe praised Trump’s ‘X factor’, distinguishing this deal from the many failed ones before it. Boulos, Kayikwamba and Nduhungirehe all highlighted the agreement’s economic dimension – which Boulos later, incorrectly, described as unique. He also told
France 24 that the joint security mechanism and oversight committee were unprecedented, though both have featured in previous peace deals between the two countries.
Washington insiders say speed was the priority. The agreement draws on elements from earlier State Department efforts. The Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) and
Forces armées de la république démocratique du Congo high commands are expected to establish a joint security mechanism, as required by the deal – though neither is likely to share sensitive intelligence with the other.
The Joint Oversight Committee will include Rwanda, Congo-K, the US,
Qatar, an African Union representative and others. Its effectiveness will be critical. If it can run a functioning secretariat, attract heavyweight leadership and secure strong US backing, it may compel the signatories to honour their commitments.
The agreement’s economic integration element is split between infrastructure and mining. Boulos says deals in both sectors will be signed at the White House in July, when Presidents
Félix Tshisekedi and
Paul Kagame are expected to attend a grand ceremony.
A bilateral US-Congo-K minerals deal is also under discussion. The riches it promises are intended to anchor the Trump administration’s commitment to the peace agreement.
Power sharing
The centrepiece is a US$760 million hydropower plant on the Ruzizi River between Rwanda and Congo-K (AC Vol 66 No 14,
Trump family allies broker security and mining deals in Central Africa). Known as Ruzizi III, the 206 MW project has been 12 years in negotiation. It is led by Industrial Promotion Services, the Aga Khan Fund’s investment arm and was finalised in June when US-owned,
Kenya-based Anzana Electric Group joined IPS, the World Bank, British International Investment and the European Investment Bank. Power will be shared between Rwanda, Congo-K and
Burundi.
It remains unclear how the infrastructure deal will address
Uganda’s push to build roads in eastern Congo-K, which would reorient trade towards Kampala and cut Rwanda’s market share. Rwanda and Uganda are competing to shape regional integration with Congo-K – a rivalry that fuels local conflicts. Despite Uganda’s military presence and trading interests, Washington has largely ignored it.
The mining agreement will be harder to implement. It stipulates that Congolese minerals should be processed in Rwanda in ‘transparent, formalised’ ways. That makes economic sense: electricity is cheaper and more reliable in Rwanda, making it better suited to refining Congolese tin and coltan. But the politics are fraught. Many in Congo-K resent the idea of their mineral wealth being processed in a rival state. Tax differentials also distort trade. Rwanda’s lower levies incentivise smuggling, which has persisted for years (AC Vol 65 No 15,
Kinshasa urges sanctions on Kigali citing damning UN report).
The 2010 US Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act aimed at curbing the trade in conflict minerals from Congo-K by requiring supply chain due diligence – but it failed to end smuggling or the flow of such minerals into western supply chains (AC Vol 53 No 23,
Dodging Dodd-Frank).
Then there is the
Mouvement du 23 mars (M23). Qatari officials have been mediating largely inconclusive talks between the militia and Kinshasa in Doha. A new round is due to begin in mid-July.
Corneille Nangaa, head of the
Alliance Fleuve Congo and M23’s political wing, had ambitions to march on Kinshasa and depose Tshisekedi – ambitions reportedly reined in by Kagame, according to the United Nations Group of Experts’ (GoE) report.
Still, M23 is consolidating its hold on captured territory. The UN GoE says it has expelled traditional leaders and civil servants across North Kivu and South Kivu, destroyed land records and forcibly recruited young men. It has also benefited from
Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda fighters repatriated to Rwanda and then sent back into Congo-K by the RDF to fight for the militia.
In late June,
Chinese-owned Twangiza Mining accused M23 of forcing its workers to labour without pay after seizing its South Kivu gold mine in May. The militia claimed the company had failed to pay taxes to its new administration.
Rubaya deal
M23’s biggest revenue source is the Bibatama coltan mine near Rubaya, which generates hundreds of thousands of dollars a month. Working conditions have deteriorated. There is no technical oversight of the hundreds of small mining shafts dug into Rubaya’s steep hills. A massive mudslide in mid-June buried scores of miners. At least 17 bodies were recovered, many more remain buried in the mud.
On 27 June,
Africa Confidential reported that
Gentry Beach – hedge fund executive, chair of America First Global and the finance co-chair of Trump’s 2016 election campaign – was negotiating with the Tshisekedi government to acquire the Rubaya permit.
America First Global would partner with
Société Aurifère du Kivu et du Maniema (SAKIMA), a state-owned firm that took over the permit after it was confiscated from Senator
Édouard Mwangachuchu’s
Société Minière de Bisunzu. Mwangachuchu, a
Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple founder, was sentenced to death by a military court in 2023 and remains in detention.
Complicating matters, the current legal owner of Rubaya, according to the mining cadastre in Kinshasa, is
Serge Mulumba and his company Congo Fair Mining. Mulumba told
Africa Confidential he knew nothing about the US investment plans. ‘We need markets and off-takers, not investors as the revenues can provide the means to develop the mine,’ he said.
If the Rubaya deal materialises, it would be the boldest element of the proposed US minerals accord with Kinshasa. But for it to happen, Kagame needs to eject the M23 from Rubaya and allow the Americans to take over – in partnership with a notoriously corrupt Congolese parastatal.
For the M23 to withdraw would mean surrendering the fiscal base of its proto-state. The GoE report argues – and many agree – that M23 is acting at Rwanda’s behest, as Kagame seeks to establish a loyal client entity next door.
If Trump succeeds in clearing the way for his allies to invest in one of Congo-K’s largest mines – while forcing the M23 and Kagame to abandon their political ambitions – it would be a remarkable achievement.
In early June, US-based Denham Capital sold its majority stake in the Alphamin tin mine in Bisie, North Kivu, to the
United Arab Emirates’s International Resource Holding. Though Alphamin was spared M23 occupation – reportedly after Boulos requested Kagame intervene – Denham sold at a discount. IRH’s CEO is
Ali Alrashdi (AC Vol 66 No 8,
Washington tries a new push in Kinshasa).
Another potential US target is the Manono lithium deposit. KoBold Metals, backed by Bill Gates and Jeff Bezos, wants to acquire the permit held by Australia’s AVZ Minerals. But in 2023, Kinshasa cancelled AVZ’s rights and split the permit, awarding half to China’s Zijin. AVZ took the matter to international arbitration, suspended proceedings at Washington’s request, but resumed them on 23 June, citing Kinshasa’s failure to engage.
KoBold hopes Zijin will retain the northern half while it develops the southern portion. It wants the Congolese government – not AVZ’s partner Cominière – as its joint venture partner. Like SAKIMA, Cominière is bankrupt and notorious for rent-seeking.
Beyond Rubaya and Manono, it is unclear what other Congolese mining assets US companies might acquire. Investors who recently assessed ERG’s copper and cobalt assets in Haut-Katanga and Lualaba walked away, deterred by the operational risks. Glencore’s assets are not for sale, nor are those of the major Chinese firms.
Congo-K’s mineral wealth is vast but converting it into American ownership will not be easy. And if the returns disappoint, Tshisekedi may need to find new ways to keep Trump interested.
