AVZ Discussion 2022

[Rechnerhand]

US firm to build $1.5bn Angola to DRC power line --> I know not our business but engagement by the US and private sector is hardly trying to be noticed.

 

[Rechnerhand]

I guess we know which bank failed the stress test ...

Congo gets $262m from IMF on treasury reforms

 

[Rechnerhand]

news coverage:

Mining Review Africa: ICC decision: AVZ legally acquired Dathomir’s shares

others?

 

[Rechnerhand]

Rwanda's Kagame unsure whether peace deal with Congo will hold by Reuters

 

[Sammy_da_Smile]

They didn’t terminate the Term Sheet, it progressed to a formal agreement, and then withdrew without drawdown

So no break fee, imo

And Locke didn’t meet the deadline for exclusivity whilst DD undertaken, despite 3 extensions, so no $200k payable

AVZ free to deal with anyone else, which they did

Our resident corporate bush lawyer may like to peer review my assertions - they could well be spurious


View attachment 88093

Certainly an interesting turn of events. From the CATH funding ann 8th Jan.

 

[RHyNO]

Always pegged Locke for a bunch of fwitts. Absolutely hilarious, imagine running a law firm of this sort. Offering exploitation level terms and then suing companies that don’t take your your high 5 when drowning. I suppose Hell needs demons. Fuck em fuck em all! Hold the fort Nigel, but for fucksake try not to get outplayed…….again.

 

[Flight996]

Certainly an interesting turn of events. From the CATH funding ann 8th Jan.

And exactly what support was that?

The funding sought by AVZ was intended to cover legal fees, expert fees, local law support, investigation costs, arbitration and court fees, and related activities against the DRC and other parties. Pretty much the same as the CATH deal.

Locke's proposed facility was secured over all of AVZ's assets, including those of its wholly owned subsidiary AVZ International Pty Ltd (AVZI), Green Lithium Holdings PTE. Ltd (GLH), and the shares held by the group in GLH and Dathcom. That's a lot of security against a piss-ant loan.

I understand that in return, Locke Capital would also acquire 60 million fully paid ordinary shares in AVZ, and be granted an option to subscribe for additional shares upon the occurrence of key value milestones. I do not know the strike price for the additional shares.

However, all I saw for 12 months was Locke fucking-over AVZ by demanding additional collateral, and driving AVZ almost to the point of insolvency. AVZ dodged a bullet when it cut Locke loose, and went with CATH instead.

A pox on Locke and all its employees and their emotional support llamas.

I need a drink. The sun is past the yard arm somewhere in the world.

Cheers
F

 

[Xerof]

Yeah, I’m trying to look at it from AVZ perspective, following the stated conditions in the Term Sheet. It’s an aggressive perspective, but the law is precise.

I agree with @cruiser when he says this was delayed for an unreasonable amount of time for ‘whatever’ reason, but I think we can assume some form of nefarious behaviour was working behind the bamboo curtain.

After all, delay after delay had only one goal - to ensure AVZ ran out of funds

 

[Hodlandwin69]

I'm sure DLA piper were heavily consulted before the board expressed their gratitude towards Locke

 

[Panther22]

They didn’t terminate the Term Sheet, it progressed to a formal agreement, and then withdrew without drawdown

So no break fee, imo

And Locke didn’t meet the deadline for exclusivity whilst DD undertaken, despite 3 extensions, so no $200k payable

AVZ free to deal with anyone else, which they did

Our resident corporate bush lawyer may like to peer review my assertions - they could well be spurious


View attachment 88093

I hope your right my friend.

 

[Xerof]

I hope your right my friend.

As i said, its an aggressive bush non-lawyer interpretation, but as someone else has said, DLA would have advised

 

[Jongo]

I suspect that the DRC and M23 fuckwits are too stubborn and stupid to sort out an agreement between themselves and hence, Boulos and others will need to meet with them. Perhaps it is so bad that DRC and M23 cannot be in the same room, which would require all negoatiations to be via a 3rd party back and forth.

From Colpilot ...

The 2–5 July 2025 peace talks between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the M23 rebel group in Doha did not result in a formal agreement, and both delegations left Qatar without setting a date to resume negotiations.

Here’s what unfolded:
What Happened During the Talks

• Delegations from both sides arrived in Doha as planned, but the meetings quickly stalled over technical issues and confidence-building measures.
• Key points of contention included:
  • The release of prisoners held by the DRC with alleged ties to M23 and Rwanda.
  • Disagreements over territorial withdrawal and political reintegration of M23 leaders.
• Sources reported that the talks bogged down early, and no significant progress was made toward a ceasefire or final peace deal.

Outcome

• Both delegations departed Doha by 5 July.
• No joint statement or follow-up schedule was issued.
• Mediators from Qatar and the African Union are reportedly working behind the scenes to reconvene talks later in July, but nothing is confirmed.

 

[Jongo]

Presumably the USA has predicted the DRC v M23 peace discussions not achieving results and hence, the USA has a Plan B.

The DRC sweeteners are well know, and the possible M23 sweeteners from Copliot are listed below. However, I suspect that Plan B will also need appeal to their greed and offer sweeteners direct to the individuals in power because they are too impatient and want the perks immediately. But how can the USA do this without bribes?

Here’s what’s likely on the table:

Indirect Incentives & Strategic Leverage

Category	Potential Sweeteners	Purpose
Security Guarantees	U.S. backing for buffer zones and third-party monitoring in eastern DRC	To reassure M23 that territorial withdrawals won’t lead to reprisals
Political Reintegration Pathways	Support for transitional justice mechanisms and limited amnesty	To allow M23 leaders to re-enter civilian life without blanket impunity
Economic Development	U.S. investment in infrastructure and mining corridors (e.g. Lobito)	To create jobs and reduce M23’s reliance on illicit mining revenues
Regional Diplomacy	Pressure on Rwanda to scale back support and endorse M23’s exit strategy	To isolate hardliners and encourage compliance from M23 factions

What’s Been Said Publicly

• The U.S. State Department has acknowledged that preliminary discussions with Congolese and Rwandan officials include “security arrangements” that would benefit all parties, including M23 indirectly.
• M23 reportedly earns ~$300,000/month from mining in eastern Congo, so any deal that secures economic alternatives could be seen as a de facto sweetener.

 

[Jongo]

Finally I asked Copilot, will the USA need to provide sweeteners direct to the DRC and M23 individuals in power because they are too impatient and want the perks immediately. But how can the USA do this without bribes?

The answer ...
That’s a sharp question, and it gets right to the heart of the diplomatic tightrope the U.S. is walking in the DRC.

Why Direct Sweeteners Are Tempting but Tricky
Yes, there’s growing pressure from individuals in power—both in the DRC government and within M23 leadership—to see immediate personal or political benefits from the peace and minerals-for-security framework. But the U.S. must tread carefully to avoid anything resembling bribery, which would violate both domestic laws (like the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) and international norms.

How the U.S. Can Offer Incentives Without Bribes
Here’s how Washington can deliver targeted benefits that feel immediate but remain above board:
1. Development Grants with Local Control

• Fund community infrastructure (roads, clinics, schools) in regions controlled by M23 or politically sensitive zones in the DRC.
• Let local leaders oversee implementation, giving them prestige and influence without direct cash transfers.

2. Security Sector Reform

• Offer training, equipment, and advisory roles to Congolese military and police units—especially those loyal to key figures.
• This boosts their status and operational capacity without handing out personal rewards.

3. Political Legitimacy Pathways

• Support transitional justice frameworks that allow M23 leaders to reintegrate into civilian or military roles.
• This gives them a future stake in governance, which can feel like a “perk” without being a payoff.

4. Fast-Tracked Economic Zones

• Create special mining or trade zones with expedited licensing and tax incentives.
• Key officials can steer investment and employment locally, gaining influence and patronage legally.

5. Visibility & Prestige

• Invite DRC and M23-aligned figures to international summits, study tours, or joint press events.
• These symbolic gestures carry real weight in local politics and can satisfy short-term ego or status needs.

Guardrails Against Corruption
To stay clean, the U.S. typically:

• Channels funds through multilateral institutions (World Bank, African Union)
• Uses performance-based disbursements
• Requires auditable outcomes and third-party monitoring

 

[wombat74]

I suspect that the DRC and M23 fuckwits are too stubborn and stupid to sort out an agreement between themselves and hence, Boulos and others will need to meet with them. Perhaps it is so bad that DRC and M23 cannot be in the same room, which would require all negoatiations to be via a 3rd party back and forth.

From Colpilot ...

The 2–5 July 2025 peace talks between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the M23 rebel group in Doha did not result in a formal agreement, and both delegations left Qatar without setting a date to resume negotiations.

Here’s what unfolded:
What Happened During the Talks

• Delegations from both sides arrived in Doha as planned, but the meetings quickly stalled over technical issues and confidence-building measures.
• Key points of contention included:
  • The release of prisoners held by the DRC with alleged ties to M23 and Rwanda.
  • Disagreements over territorial withdrawal and political reintegration of M23 leaders.
• Sources reported that the talks bogged down early, and no significant progress was made toward a ceasefire or final peace deal.

Outcome

• Both delegations departed Doha by 5 July.
• No joint statement or follow-up schedule was issued.
• Mediators from Qatar and the African Union are reportedly working behind the scenes to reconvene talks later in July, but nothing is confirmed.

Let'S face it , Peace is a pipe dream . It's the stuff of fairytales and moonbeams . Security for Minerals is our main game . Why should it be that the West can only access minerals if they can broker a peace deal that is nigh impossible , yet the Chinese are developing and mining at break neck speed without a care in the world . Manono is over 1000kms away from the fighting . These f--kers will drag this peace BS out until pigs learn how to fly . IMO

 

[LEFOOL]

Hehehe @Xerof

 

[Xerof]

Yeah, I thought it was quite mild

Anyway, I posted it twice, second one sans cretin and c..t

 

[Retrobyte]

I love that for some reason moderated posts on HC are still visible to me, even though they've been removed. Here's a screenshot from my account ....

 

[cruiser51]

I love that for some reason moderated posts on HC are still visible to me, even though they've been removed. Here's a screenshot from my account ....

View attachment 88144

It must have been the night shift moderator, operating under the cover of darkness when our posts were moderated, only nightshift poster active at the time of moderation was no other than readyaimfire, the man with a huge mental problem.
The toilet is probably his 3rd grade student.

So funny he went for it again.

 

[Dave Evans]

Finally I asked Copilot, will the USA need to provide sweeteners direct to the DRC and M23 individuals in power because they are too impatient and want the perks immediately. But how can the USA do this without bribes?

The answer ...
That’s a sharp question, and it gets right to the heart of the diplomatic tightrope the U.S. is walking in the DRC.

Why Direct Sweeteners Are Tempting but Tricky
Yes, there’s growing pressure from individuals in power—both in the DRC government and within M23 leadership—to see immediate personal or political benefits from the peace and minerals-for-security framework. But the U.S. must tread carefully to avoid anything resembling bribery, which would violate both domestic laws (like the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) and international norms.

How the U.S. Can Offer Incentives Without Bribes
Here’s how Washington can deliver targeted benefits that feel immediate but remain above board:
1. Development Grants with Local Control

• Fund community infrastructure (roads, clinics, schools) in regions controlled by M23 or politically sensitive zones in the DRC.
• Let local leaders oversee implementation, giving them prestige and influence without direct cash transfers.

2. Security Sector Reform

• Offer training, equipment, and advisory roles to Congolese military and police units—especially those loyal to key figures.
• This boosts their status and operational capacity without handing out personal rewards.

3. Political Legitimacy Pathways

• Support transitional justice frameworks that allow M23 leaders to reintegrate into civilian or military roles.
• This gives them a future stake in governance, which can feel like a “perk” without being a payoff.

4. Fast-Tracked Economic Zones

• Create special mining or trade zones with expedited licensing and tax incentives.
• Key officials can steer investment and employment locally, gaining influence and patronage legally.

5. Visibility & Prestige

• Invite DRC and M23-aligned figures to international summits, study tours, or joint press events.
• These symbolic gestures carry real weight in local politics and can satisfy short-term ego or status needs.

Guardrails Against Corruption
To stay clean, the U.S. typically:

• Channels funds through multilateral institutions (World Bank, African Union)
• Uses performance-based disbursements
• Requires auditable outcomes and third-party monitoring

Trump paused the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act earlier this year