AVZ Discussion 2022

Flight996

Regular
  • Haha
  • Like
Reactions: 11 users

Sangster

Regular
Why do i get the feeling that Felix just doesnt want to be there...:ROFLMAO:
Not enough corruption in Washington for his liking, which is really saying something.
 
  • Haha
  • Like
Reactions: 5 users

BRICK

Zeebot Located
Not enough corruption in Washington for his liking, which is really saying something.
Yeah I’m dubious about this after watching some interviews and seeing the body language of these 2
 
  • Like
Reactions: 3 users

Sangster

Regular
The funniest thing I've seen for a long time.

Can that lard factory even walk and chew gum at the same time?
Give the guy a break. It's s hard for someone that fat to walk, let alone while chewing gum and embezzling billions of dollars.
 
  • Haha
Reactions: 4 users

Sangster

Regular
Yeah I’m dubious about this after watching some interviews and seeing the body language of these 2
I'm sure Felix and Donald will get along just fine. If Felix starts looking like a Jaffa we'll know Donald is rubbing off on him.
 
  • Haha
  • Like
Reactions: 6 users

Shire

Regular
Yeah I’m dubious about this after watching some interviews and seeing the body language of these 2
Felix and Kagame hate each others’ guts for sure.

I saw Kagame being interviewed and he was asked, ‘what is one thing you would change about Africa?’ He replied ‘remove Felix Tshisekedi’.

But the US will put them both in a head lock to get to their minerals.
 
  • Like
  • Fire
Reactions: 10 users

BRICK

Zeebot Located
Felix and Kagame hate each others’ guts for sure.

I saw Kagame being interviewed and he was asked, ‘what is one thing you would change about Africa?’ He replied ‘remove Felix Tshisekedi’.

But the US will put them both in a head lock to get to their minerals.
Yeah they had the just been fucked by Donny look 😂
 
  • Haha
  • Like
Reactions: 5 users

BRICK

Zeebot Located
Felix really impressed :LOL:


Fast forward to 5 minutes in

 
  • Haha
  • Like
  • Fire
Reactions: 19 users

Flight996

Regular

Congo fighting flares within hours of Trump's peace deal ceremony​


1764968663441.png



Dec 5 (Reuters) -

Fighting raged in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo on Friday, a day after U.S. President Donald Trump hosted Congolese and Rwandan leaders in Washington to sign new deals aimed at ending years of conflict in a region rich in minerals.

Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi and Rwanda's Paul Kagame on Thursday reaffirmed commitments to a U.S.-brokered deal reached in June to stabilise the vast country and open the way for more Western mining investment.

"We're settling a war that's been going on for decades," said Trump, whose administration has intervened in a string of conflicts around the world to burnish his credentials as a peacemaker and advance U.S. business interests.

FIERCE FIGHTING CONTINUES ON THE GROUND
On the ground, however, fierce fighting continued, with the warring sides blaming one another.

The Rwandan-backed AFC/M23 rebel group, which seized the two largest cities in eastern Congo this year and is not bound by the Washington agreement, said forces loyal to the government were conducting widespread attacks.

The M23 said bombs fired from Burundi for more than three days had struck villages in North and South Kivu, killing women and children, wounding civilians and destroying homes, schools and health centres. It accused Burundi, an ally of Congo, of coordinating airstrikes using drones and heavy artillery.

A spokesperson for Burundi could not be immediately reached for comment.

Meanwhile, Congo's army said it was not targeting civilians but that clashes were continuing and Rwandan forces were carrying out strikes.

It said it had neutralised an enemy drone that entered Congolese airspace from Bugarama in Rwanda, and accused M23 fighters of repeatedly violating a ceasefire.

M23 said 23 people had been killed and several others injured while a Congolese army spokesperson said 11 civilians had been killed during fighting.

Analysts say U.S. diplomacy paused an escalation of fighting in eastern Congo but failed to resolve core issues, with neither Congo nor Rwanda fulfilling pledges made in June.

Videos shared online showed dozens of displaced families fleeing on foot with their belongings and livestock near the town of Luvungi in eastern Congo. Reuters was not immediately able to authenticate them.

CIVILIANS CAUGHT UP IN CONFLICT
"Numerous homes have been destroyed, and women as well as children have tragically lost their lives," wrote Lawrence Kanyuka, spokesperson for AFC/M23.

Forces loyal to the Congolese government "continued their relentless attacks on densely populated areas of North Kivu and South Kivu, using fighter jets, drones and heavy artillery", he wrote on X.

A Congo army spokesperson confirmed to Reuters that clashes were taking place along the Kaziba-Katogota-Rurambo axis in South Kivu province.

Reagan Mbuyi Kalonji, army spokesperson for South Kivu, said the Congolese army had only targeted fighters in the hills above Kaziba and Rurambo.

"There is population displacement in Luvungi due to Rwandan Defence Force bombardment. They are bombing blindly," he said.

Rwanda's army and government could not immediately be reached for comment.

A senior AFC/M23 official said rebel forces had retaken the town of Luberika and shot down a Congolese army drone. Requesting anonymity as he was not authorised to speak to media, he said the war was continuing, irrespective of the agreement signed in Washington.

The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs said that, since December 2, intense fighting has resulted in civilian deaths, injuries and displacement.

Clashes and roadblocks have made evacuations impossible, preventing an unknown number of wounded civilians from reaching medical facilities for treatment, U.N. spokesperson Stephane Dujarric said.

The U.N. children's agency UNICEF on Friday said it was alarmed by clashes on December 3 and 4 in South Kivu that hit three schools and another site near a school, reportedly killing at least seven children and injuring others.

"In 2025, fighting has intensified to levels not seen in years, and children, as always, are bearing the brunt," its statement said, urging a halt to attacks on education facilities.
 
  • Sad
  • Like
  • Wow
Reactions: 10 users

OmarsCominYo

Regular
For those that don't read HC, the following analysis by a new account (@mitchelllangdon) was posted this morning;



Hi everyone, finally decided to upload my first post and weigh in here. I’ve been watching for years (and holding through the pain just like the rest of you), but after reading the full text of this new US–DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement, I think a lot of people are missing what’s buried in the Annexures.

If you actually read Annex 1 and 2, this treaty doesn’t name Manono, but it does set up a framework that strongly favours a US-aligned solution over a China-controlled one.

Here’s how I see it, without getting too bogged down in legal jargon.



The “Covered Nation” squeeze on Zijin
Annex 2 defines a “covered nation” by pointing to US law (10 U.S.C. § 4872). That list is China, Russia, Iran and North Korea.

Annex 1 then says that for a project to qualify as a Qualifying Strategic Project under this Agreement (and access the full “strategic” package – incentives, US-backed finance, Lobito focus, etc.), no more than 40% of the equity can be held by anyone who is not a US person or an “aligned person”. That cap then tightens over time to 30%, 20% and finally 10% over 20 years.

Chinese entities are explicitly outside the “aligned person” definition, so they sit in that capped bucket.

Zijin currently claims to own about 61% of the Northern Tenement JV (Manono Lithium SAS), with Cominière on 39%. That structure is basically incompatible with QSP status as written in the treaty.



The Agreement does not outright ban Zijin or stop the DRC issuing them permits. What it does mean is:

  • A Zijin-controlled north cannot be treated as a flagship “strategic” project under this framework unless their stake is cut back to a capped minority; and
  • The DRC would have to walk away from a lot of US political and financial upside if it insists on keeping the current 61/39 Chinese-majority structure.
So while it’s not an immediate “kill switch”, it is a very deliberate structural squeeze on a Chinese-majority north.



SOEs, Cominière and how the DRC can pivot
Article XIII requires the DRC to review the beneficial ownership and leadership structures of its mining SOEs and to endeavour to use those stakes to facilitate investment by US and aligned investors.

That obviously puts Cominière squarely under the microscope.

It doesn’t, by itself, void the Northern Tenement deal or magically strip PR15775. But it does:

  • Put Cominière’s arrangements into a formal governance review within a US–DRC strategic framework; and
  • Make it politically and diplomatically easier to revisit deals that cut across ICC/ICSID decisions or earlier findings by DRC oversight bodies.
If the DRC chooses to move the northern area into the new Strategic Asset Reserve (SAR), then under Article VII any new SAR project in that ground has to run through:

  • A right of first offer and initial negotiation window for US persons; and only
  • If no US proposal is accepted, a window for aligned persons (which would include Australian companies).
In that set-up, Zijin is highly unlikely to regain majority control. At best they’d be negotiating for a capped minority role under a US/aligned-led structure, if they’re in the tent at all.

So I wouldn’t say “game over” in a legal sense yet, but the rules of the game have definitely shifted against a Chinese-majority northern JV.



Why knocking back KoBold’s first swing makes more sense now
We know from AVZ’s update that the framework it signed with KoBold is non-binding and non-exclusive, and that AVZ is now running a competitive process with multiple US-aligned parties. KoBold doesn’t have this sewn up.

If KoBold’s first proposal effectively priced AVZ as a distressed litigant stuck in court, rejecting that and forcing a broader bidding process looks pretty rational in light of this Agreement:

  • AVZ has the data, the long-term work on the deposit and the legal claims over the original PR13359 area.
  • The US needs a Manono outcome that looks bankable and rules-based, not like another headline about expropriation and ignored arbitration awards.
  • The SPA architecture makes it much harder to simply ignore AVZ’s arbitration wins and hand a flagship lithium asset to a Chinese-controlled structure without undermining the whole “responsible critical minerals” narrative.
My personal read is that AVZ likely had some visibility that a US–DRC strategic framework was coming and chose not to lock in a deal at “distressed” levels.

We don’t have official confirmation that there are exactly three US bidders, but we do know there is more than one party in the frame. This Agreement makes a US-aligned, unified Manono development the most logical end state if the DRC wants to maximise both money and political leverage. That’s where the “Super Pit” concept starts to look more than just a dream, even though the treaty itself does not literally reunify the tenements.



Why a buy-in or buyout still looks like the natural endgame
The Agreement gives US persons a right of first offer on SAR projects and only lets aligned persons (like AVZ as an Australian company) into the formal SAR process once the US window has played out.

It doesn’t say “push aligned partners out”, but it does structurally favour:

  • A US-led operating consortium as the public face of any strategic Manono project; and
  • Ownership structures where non-aligned players like Zijin are capped minorities over time.
For that to happen cleanly at Manono, someone still has to resolve:

  • AVZ’s ICSID and ICC rights and awards;
  • Cominière’s position; and
  • The existing PR15775 allocation to Zijin’s JV.
The simplest way for a US operator to clear the decks is either:

  • Buy AVZ out at a proper arbitration-informed price; or
  • Bring AVZ in as a meaningful minority partner in a new US-led QSP/SAR structure, with clean title and clear offtake terms.
Given the way the Agreement is written (emphasising US persons first and SAR/QSP incentives), I personally think a cash-heavy deal for AVZ is more likely than AVZ itself being the long-term partner, but that’s a deal-flow view, not a legal requirement.



In my view, this Agreement is the US and DRC building a policy scaffold that:

  • Strongly discourages Chinese-majority control of flagship critical mineral projects;
  • Puts Cominière and the whole Manono saga under much closer joint scrutiny;
  • Channels strategic assets like Manono towards US and aligned operators using the Lobito Corridor; and
  • Makes it much harder to sidestep AVZ’s legal position without scaring off the very US investors this treaty is designed to attract.
It doesn’t instantly tear up Zijin’s licence, and it doesn’t guarantee a specific dollar figure for us. But it absolutely improves the odds that the Northern Tenement ends up folded into a US-aligned, unified Manono solution where AVZ is compensated at something above “distressed litigant” levels.

GLTAH. Hoping this works out for all of us. Do your own research, not financial advice.
 
  • Like
  • Fire
  • Love
Reactions: 44 users

Dazmac66

Regular
"Something above distressed litigant".
Tree fiddy one!
 
  • Like
  • Haha
  • Fire
Reactions: 17 users

hedrox

Regular
I would say, Kobold will put in a more reasonable offer asap, may be even before Chrissy ....cant see Kobold dragging that all out for to much longer. Sure they want to start construction as fast as possible and get on with it.
As well, as longer they wait...it will come more and more expansive in a Lithium bull market.
It feels like early easter eggs this time...GL
 
  • Like
  • Thinking
Reactions: 16 users

Sangster

Regular
For those that don't read HC, the following analysis by a new account (@mitchelllangdon) was posted this morning;



Hi everyone, finally decided to upload my first post and weigh in here. I’ve been watching for years (and holding through the pain just like the rest of you), but after reading the full text of this new US–DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement, I think a lot of people are missing what’s buried in the Annexures.

If you actually read Annex 1 and 2, this treaty doesn’t name Manono, but it does set up a framework that strongly favours a US-aligned solution over a China-controlled one.

Here’s how I see it, without getting too bogged down in legal jargon.



The “Covered Nation” squeeze on Zijin
Annex 2 defines a “covered nation” by pointing to US law (10 U.S.C. § 4872). That list is China, Russia, Iran and North Korea.

Annex 1 then says that for a project to qualify as a Qualifying Strategic Project under this Agreement (and access the full “strategic” package – incentives, US-backed finance, Lobito focus, etc.), no more than 40% of the equity can be held by anyone who is not a US person or an “aligned person”. That cap then tightens over time to 30%, 20% and finally 10% over 20 years.

Chinese entities are explicitly outside the “aligned person” definition, so they sit in that capped bucket.

Zijin currently claims to own about 61% of the Northern Tenement JV (Manono Lithium SAS), with Cominière on 39%. That structure is basically incompatible with QSP status as written in the treaty.



The Agreement does not outright ban Zijin or stop the DRC issuing them permits. What it does mean is:


  • A Zijin-controlled north cannot be treated as a flagship “strategic” project under this framework unless their stake is cut back to a capped minority; and
  • The DRC would have to walk away from a lot of US political and financial upside if it insists on keeping the current 61/39 Chinese-majority structure.
So while it’s not an immediate “kill switch”, it is a very deliberate structural squeeze on a Chinese-majority north.



SOEs, Cominière and how the DRC can pivot
Article XIII requires the DRC to review the beneficial ownership and leadership structures of its mining SOEs and to endeavour to use those stakes to facilitate investment by US and aligned investors.

That obviously puts Cominière squarely under the microscope.

It doesn’t, by itself, void the Northern Tenement deal or magically strip PR15775. But it does:


  • Put Cominière’s arrangements into a formal governance review within a US–DRC strategic framework; and
  • Make it politically and diplomatically easier to revisit deals that cut across ICC/ICSID decisions or earlier findings by DRC oversight bodies.
If the DRC chooses to move the northern area into the new Strategic Asset Reserve (SAR), then under Article VII any new SAR project in that ground has to run through:

  • A right of first offer and initial negotiation window for US persons; and only
  • If no US proposal is accepted, a window for aligned persons (which would include Australian companies).
In that set-up, Zijin is highly unlikely to regain majority control. At best they’d be negotiating for a capped minority role under a US/aligned-led structure, if they’re in the tent at all.

So I wouldn’t say “game over” in a legal sense yet, but the rules of the game have definitely shifted against a Chinese-majority northern JV.



Why knocking back KoBold’s first swing makes more sense now
We know from AVZ’s update that the framework it signed with KoBold is non-binding and non-exclusive, and that AVZ is now running a competitive process with multiple US-aligned parties. KoBold doesn’t have this sewn up.

If KoBold’s first proposal effectively priced AVZ as a distressed litigant stuck in court, rejecting that and forcing a broader bidding process looks pretty rational in light of this Agreement:


  • AVZ has the data, the long-term work on the deposit and the legal claims over the original PR13359 area.
  • The US needs a Manono outcome that looks bankable and rules-based, not like another headline about expropriation and ignored arbitration awards.
  • The SPA architecture makes it much harder to simply ignore AVZ’s arbitration wins and hand a flagship lithium asset to a Chinese-controlled structure without undermining the whole “responsible critical minerals” narrative.
My personal read is that AVZ likely had some visibility that a US–DRC strategic framework was coming and chose not to lock in a deal at “distressed” levels.

We don’t have official confirmation that there are exactly three US bidders, but we do know there is more than one party in the frame. This Agreement makes a US-aligned, unified Manono development the most logical end state if the DRC wants to maximise both money and political leverage. That’s where the “Super Pit” concept starts to look more than just a dream, even though the treaty itself does not literally reunify the tenements.



Why a buy-in or buyout still looks like the natural endgame
The Agreement gives US persons a right of first offer on SAR projects and only lets aligned persons (like AVZ as an Australian company) into the formal SAR process once the US window has played out.

It doesn’t say “push aligned partners out”, but it does structurally favour:


  • A US-led operating consortium as the public face of any strategic Manono project; and
  • Ownership structures where non-aligned players like Zijin are capped minorities over time.
For that to happen cleanly at Manono, someone still has to resolve:

  • AVZ’s ICSID and ICC rights and awards;
  • Cominière’s position; and
  • The existing PR15775 allocation to Zijin’s JV.
The simplest way for a US operator to clear the decks is either:

  • Buy AVZ out at a proper arbitration-informed price; or
  • Bring AVZ in as a meaningful minority partner in a new US-led QSP/SAR structure, with clean title and clear offtake terms.
Given the way the Agreement is written (emphasising US persons first and SAR/QSP incentives), I personally think a cash-heavy deal for AVZ is more likely than AVZ itself being the long-term partner, but that’s a deal-flow view, not a legal requirement.



In my view, this Agreement is the US and DRC building a policy scaffold that:


  • Strongly discourages Chinese-majority control of flagship critical mineral projects;
  • Puts Cominière and the whole Manono saga under much closer joint scrutiny;
  • Channels strategic assets like Manono towards US and aligned operators using the Lobito Corridor; and
  • Makes it much harder to sidestep AVZ’s legal position without scaring off the very US investors this treaty is designed to attract.
It doesn’t instantly tear up Zijin’s licence, and it doesn’t guarantee a specific dollar figure for us. But it absolutely improves the odds that the Northern Tenement ends up folded into a US-aligned, unified Manono solution where AVZ is compensated at something above “distressed litigant” levels.

GLTAH. Hoping this works out for all of us. Do your own research, not financial advice.
That's an awful lot of speculation based entirely on ignoring that the US has made it clear they intend to leave Zijin with the north. The south will be treated as a separate project, if we who legally own the entire site decide to sell our interests.
 
  • Like
Reactions: 6 users

JNRB

Regular
That's an awful lot of speculation based entirely on ignoring that the US has made it clear they intend to leave Zijin with the north. The south will be treated as a separate project, if we who legally own the entire site decide to sell our interests.
KOKO made it clear thet we're willing to leave zijin in the North.
Im not sure thats USA policy
 
  • Like
Reactions: 9 users

Uglybob

Regular
That's an awful lot of speculation based entirely on ignoring that the US has made it clear they intend to leave Zijin with the north. The south will be treated as a separate project, if we who legally own the entire site decide to sell our interests.
And it's completely against all rules of politics to say one thing and be secretly doing something different in the background that is the complete opposite from what the mouth piece is saying...
 
  • Like
Reactions: 2 users

Winenut

GO AVZ!!!!
KOKO made it clear thet we're willing to leave zijin in the North.
Im not sure thats USA policy
It's certainly not my fucking policy......
 
  • Like
  • Fire
  • Haha
Reactions: 13 users
Top Bottom